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A LEAST BAD APPROACH FOR INTERPRETING ESA
STEALTH PROVISIONS
MADELINE JUNE KASS*
ABSTRACT
Scholars have come to recognize the existence of certain stealth-
like provisions neatly tucked within the text of the federal Endangered
Species Act ("ESA"). At the time of enactment, these provisions-if not
invisible to Congress-appeared at most innocuous or insignificant. As
originally written, section 7 of the ESA constitutes one such stealth pro-
vision. Inconspicuously titled "Interagency cooperation,"1 the provision
seemed little more than a humble procedural hoop to agency action. Judi-
cial statutory interpretation, however, clarified that this seemingly docile
procedural requirement in fact contained a formidable substantive man-
date of the Act. A second stealth provision resides in section 8a of the ESA.
Modestly titled "Convention implementation,"2 the name suggests little
more than administrative direction. However, closer inspection reveals
that the provision potentially packs more than procedural minutia. With
escalating species losses worldwide, there seems little doubt that future
litigants will look to apply this provision in aid of biodiversity protection
and species conservation. At such time, the federal courts will be forced to
grapple, yet again, with the interpretive dilemma of an ESA stealth pro-
vision. This Article sets out an approach for how ESA stealth provisions
might be interpreted to achieve principled outcomes in such situations.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I am grateful to Teresa
Salamone and JoAnne Dunec, editors of NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT, and to
Professor Robert Whitman for their valuable input.
1 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
2 Id. § 1537a.
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INTRODUCTION
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rathera
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-
neither more nor less."3
Scholars have come to recognize the existence of stealth
provisions neatly tucked within the text of the federal Endangered
Species Act 4 ("ESA"). By "stealth" provisions, I mean something akin to
"sleepers"-legislative provisions that garner little congressional or public
attention at the time of enactment, but achieve importance in response
to either subsequent strategic litigation initiatives5 or with application
to seemingly new or previously unidentified environmental problems.6
With stealth provisions, however, I intend a particular subset of
sleepers-provisions strategically inserted to empower future litigants and
yet fall below congressional radar. At the time of enactment, these
provisions-if not invisible to Congress-appear at most innocuous or
insignificant.'
3 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,174 n.18 (1978)(quoting Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking
Glass, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL 196 (1939)).
4 Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(2000)).
5 Examples of these types of sleeper provisions are the total maximum daily load ("TMDL")
provisions in section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000).
Section 303 of the CWA garnered scant attention in Congress at adoption, but took on
significance after a barrage of citizen lawsuits. See Erin Tobin, Pronsolino v. Nastri: Are
TMDLs for Nonpoint Sources the Key to Controlling the "Unregulated" Half of Water
Pollution?, 33 ENVTL. L. 807, 813 (2003); Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL
Program V: Aftershock and Prelude, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,385, 10,405
(2002).
6 An example of this type of sleeper provision is section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899 ("RHA"), 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000). Section 13 of the RHA began as a seemingly nar-
row regulation for addressing navigational obstructions, but came to be used more expan-
sively for the regulation of water pollution. See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER
ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND
HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 10-12 (2004); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Industrial Water Pollution
and the Refuse Act: A Second Chance For Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 766-77
(1971).
7 The idea that stealth provisions might be hidden away within the "nooks and crannies"
of the act is not a novel one. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Endangered Species Act Lessons Over
30 Years, and the Legacy of the Snail Darter, a Small Fish in a Pork Barrel, 34 ENVTL.
L. 289, 292 (2004).
A LEAST BAD APPROACH
As originally written, section 7 of the ESA constituted one such
stealth provision. Inconspicuously titled "Interagency cooperation,"' the
provision seemed little more than a humble procedural hoop to agency
action. Judicial statutory interpretation, however, quickly clarified (or
transformed, depending on your perspective) that the seemingly docile
procedural requirement in fact contained a formidable substantive
mandate of the Act. This provision is more commonly, and perhaps more
appropriately, referred to as the "no jeopardy" provision,9 and even as
amended retains substantive bite.
A second stealth provision resides in section 8a of the ESA. Mod-
estly titled "Convention implementation,"1" the name suggests little more
than administrative direction. However, closer inspection reveals that the
provision potentially packs more than procedural minutia. Consequently,
it seems likely that future litigants will seek to rouse this provision in
aid of biodiversity and species conservation.11 At such time, the federal
courts will be forced to grapple, yet again, with the scope and meaning of
an ESA stealth provision.
My objective here is to identify an approach to statutory inter-
pretation of such ESA stealth provisions worthy of application in these
endeavors-an interpretive approach that allows rational and just results
or at least avoids perverse pernicious ones. Towards this goal, Part I of
this Article reviews prevailing approaches to statutory interpretation
along with some basic critiques of ESA, as background to discussion in
the later parts of the Article. Parts III and IV, respectively, discuss specific
interpretative approaches taken with respect to the ESA's "no jeopardy"
stealth provision and provide some observations about how other ESA
stealth provisions might be interpreted to achieve principled outcomes.
8 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
9 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV.
885, 910, 913 (2002).
10 16 U.S.C. § 1537a (2000).
11 As one commentator notes: "Despite the fact that the international provisions of the
ESA are little known and underused, they continue to be a vital part of the act. Although
long in the background of endangered species efforts in this country, the international
provisions of the act are bound to increase in importance." Carlon A. Balistrieri,
International Aspects of the Endangered Species Act, in ENDANGERED SPECIEs ACT: LAW,
POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 485, 499 (Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002).
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I. PREVAILING THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Academics have advanced more than a few theoretical explanations
as to how federal courts ought to and actually do interpret statutes. 12
Although no one theory prevails, 3 the three predominant statutory inter-
pretation approaches embrace legislative intent, textual meaning, and
dynamic assessment to construe statutory provisions. 4 In the adminis-
trative context, often at play in environmental and natural resource cases,
courts explicitly overlay a fourth interpretive approach for resolving statu-
tory ambiguity: deference to administrative agency interpretations.' 5 This
section briefly describes each of these statutory interpretation approaches,
their theoretical underpinnings, and their respective deficiencies. 6
12 In fact, Professor Eskridge notes that theories of statutory interpretation have
"blossomed like dandelions in spring." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 1 (1994) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
1994]. In sync with the dandelion hypothesis, Professor Mullins surmises that "[ilf any-
thing, we have today a surplus of theories." Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The
Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 16 (2003). Professor Mullins
lists, among others theories, originalism, intentionalism, modified intentionalism, imagi-
native reconstruction, purposivism, textualism, new textualism, structural textualism,
pragmatic textualism, radical textualism, sympathetic textualism, dynamic statutory
interpretation, and practical reasoning. Id. at 17-18, 22.
13 Mullins, supra note 12, at 19 ("[N]o single theory has yet achieved consensus among
academics or the courts.").
14 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 211 (2d
ed. 2006) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION].
5 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 405,
444-46 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes].
16 Apart from, yet related to, the how to problems of statutory interpretation, the very
notion of legal interpretation is subject to what is it problems. Accordingly, Richard Posner
asserts that activity of interpretation is "a chameleon" limited in usefulness by its
ambiguity. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 271 (1990). Posner
argues that:
A word of broad, even indefinite, meaning, interpretation can mean as
little as working within a tradition, as opposed to taking a God's-eye
view of things. It can signify even less: it can function merely as a
reminder that our understanding of 'the world' is mediated, perhaps
even constituted, by language. It is the latest in a long, long list of words
abused by lawyers.
Id. at 247. Is interpretation merely synonymous with explanation, a determination of
meaning similar to translation, a decision procedure, the completion of a command, and/or
a form of self-expression, or a "search for legislative meaning in the context of the par-
ticular question before the court?" ABNER J. MIKvA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 6 (1997). To some extent, this
Article considers both the what is it and the how to question.
A LEAST BAD APPROACH
A. Legislative Intent
Intentionalist interpreters seek to "discover or replicate the leg-
islature's original intent as the answer to an interpretive question."17
According to William Blackstone, interpretation seeks to uncover the "will
of the legislator... by exploring his intentions" as manifested in "signs the
most natural and probable." i" The intentionalist approach posits that
legislative intent represents the object and touchstone of statutory inter-
pretation 9 and sees courts as mere agents of the legislature.2" In pursuit
of the holy grail of original intent, intentionalists may rely on a specific
intent approach (what were the original legislators' actual beliefs
regarding the provision),2" an imaginative reconstruction approach
(what would the original legislators have decided had they considered the
issue),22 and/or purposivism (consistency with the original legislators'
general objective or purpose for enacting the legislation).23 Intentionalists
typically examine and give weight to a statute's text in combination with
its context and background.24
The cachet of legislative intent approaches rests on their demo-
cratic appeal. As succinctly described by Professor Eskridge, "[i]f the leg-
islature is the primary lawmaker and interpreters are its agents, then
requiring interpreters to follow the legislature's intentions constrains their
17 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 14.
18 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *1 (emphasis omitted).
19 See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 14 (citing
NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 (5th ed.1984));
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 (1985). Professor
Stanley Fish puts it this way: "Think about it: if interpreting a document is to be a
rational act, if its exercise is to have a goal... , then it must have an object to aim at,
and the only candidate for that object is the author's intention." Stanley Fish, Op-Ed.,
Intentional Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2005, at A25.
2 See Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 15, at 415. But Sunstein has also sug-
gested that such sentiments, particularly with respect to Blackstone's thinking, may merely
reflect a "ceremonial bow" to legislative supremacy. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 891 (2003).
21 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 16 ("The mean-
ing colloquially suggested by the invocation of legislative intent is the actual intentions
of the legislative coalition that enacted the statute.").22 Id. at 22; POSNER, supra note 16, at 273.
23 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 25-26.
24 Bradford C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating
Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY.
L.J. 527, 529 (1997-98); see also Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 15, at 424.
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choices and advances democracy by carrying out the will of the elected
legislators."21 Simply put, the intentionalist approaches fit (or appear to
fit) the basic conception of our representative tri-parte democracy: Congress
makes laws, the Executive implements the laws, and the Judiciary inter-
prets the laws.
Disenchantment with the legislative intent approaches stems
both from pragmatic and theoretical considerations. Critics condemn the
pursuit of specific intent as unknowable or unreliable because legislators
have no shared intent;26 because such shared intent, if it exists at all, is
not readily discoverable; because the legislative history that does exist
is too readily manipulated by strategic behavior;2 7 and because judges
might simply get it wrong.28 Similar concerns plague the more ambi-
tious, imaginative reconstruction approach, which by its very nature is
more indeterminate than actual intent, and, therefore, susceptible to
derision as "more 'imaginative' than 'reconstructive"' 29 and more prone
to judicial policymaking than to objective evaluation. °
25 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 14.
2 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983)
("Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have 'intents' or 'designs,'
hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have a design. The body as a
whole, however, has only outcomes."); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and
Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J. 281, 290 (1989) ("The idea of legislative intent...
is notoriously slippery. If it is taken to require that a majority of the legislators share the
same subjective view of the statute, the condition will rarely be met."); Mullins, supra
note 12, at 25 ("'Intention' strongly connotes a state of mind. This makes any theory
christened 'intentionalism' vulnerable to criticisms that conglomerate legislative bodies
do not have 'intentions.'").27 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 16.
21 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 892 (noting that common law intention-
alism and purposivism "show remarkably little awareness of several relevant possibilities"
including, among others, "that judges might mistake legislative purposes").
29 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 23. See
Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 537 ("If the question of a statute's domain may not often
be resolved by reference to actual design, it may never properly be resolved by reference
to imputed design."); POSNER, supra note 16, at 273-76 (noting that imaginative recon-
struction imposes upon the interpreter the "impossible task" of imagining how persons
differently historically situated and with different values (e.g., differences in "training,
upbringing, and experiences") would decide a question if they knew what the interpreter
knows now, and how in doing so, the interpreter changes the original legislators into
different people: ourselves).3 0 See POSNER, supra note 16, at 273-74 (noting that the risk of imaginative reconstruction
"is that of making a statute appear to say what the judges think it ought to say").
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Another criticism of legislative intentionalism objects to its static
nature. By exclusively focusing on the particular intent of the enacting
legislature, the interpreter fixes statutory interpretation to a single
moment in history,3' regardless of interim scientific advancements, new
or unforeseen ecological events, or sociopolitical realignments. To combat
concerns of stagnancy and purposivism, the third legislative intent
approach 32 adopts a more robust, evolutionary strategy. As described by
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, interpretation involves deciding "what
purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any subordinate
provision of it which may be involved" and interpreting "the words of the
statute ... in question so as to carry out the purpose as best it can."33
Purposivism allows the interpreter to identify the general purpose of the
statute and then choose the specific interpretation most consistent with
that purpose. 34 "Purposivism is an attractive alternative to intentionalism
because it allows a statute to evolve to meet new problems while
ensuring legitimacy by tying interpretation to original legislative
expectations. 35
Nevertheless, purposivism remains burdened with some of the
same pragmatic considerations as other legislative intent approaches.
Critics assert that, just as uncovering specific intent may not be realis-
tically achievable, so too the interpreter's search for a unifying statutory
objective or goal may be akin to searching for the holy grail:
Even if there is agreement as to which purpose should be
attributed to a statute, the analysis in the hard cases must
still be indeterminate. An attributed policy purpose is too
general and malleable to yield interpretive closure in spe-
31 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 9-10.
32 Although I discuss purposivism as a subcategory of intentionalism, purposivism may
equally be classified as a stand-alone foundational theory of statutory interpretation apart
from intentionalism. See Mank, supra note 24, at 529.
33 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958).
' The interpreter finds the statute's purpose by "comparing the new law with the old"
and asking whether reasonable persons, "confronted with the law as it was, [would] have
enacted this new law to replace it[.]" Id. at 1378.
35 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 26 (emphasis
added). Arguably, purposivism goes beyond intentionalism by moving from legislative
intentions to legislative expectations. See Mank, supra note 24, at 529.
2008] 433
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
cific cases, for its application depends on context and the
interpreter's perspective.36
Yet another argument against purposivism, along these same lines,
contends that the presence of political compromise in statutory drafting
"makes the discernment of purpose difficult and often impossible."37
Lastly, there is the problem that judicial discretion in characterization
ofjudicial purposes will be inappropriately affected by political or ideo-
logical leanings of judges.38
In sum, some scholars maintain that "the purposes behind rules
can usually, although not always, be discovered, and once discovered
they provide reliable guidance in applying the rule to a new
situation;"39 while others remain concerned that a statute's attributed
general purpose may simply be too general (squishy, indeterminate,
and vague) to adequately constrain the interpreter's preferences to
original legislative (majority-based) preferences.4
B. Textualism
Another statutory interpretation approach rejects legislative
intent as the focal point of statutory interpretation and, instead, opts
for textualism. Textualism starts with, relies on, and frequently ends
with, the language of the statute itself to determine meaning.
Interpretation emphasizes the text itself, and its advocates look to
dictionary meanings, grammatical rules, cannons of interpretation,
36 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 29. Professor
Eskridge posits that purposivism shares the same theoretical vulnerabilities as other
theories of intentionalism: "purposivism cannot connect its results with original legis-
lative expectations because it has no robust positive theory of enacting coalitions."Id. at
31-32.37 POSNER, supra note 16, at 278. A reciprocal criticism posits that reliance on purposivism
can too easily undo legislatively- fought and strategically-entered compromises. Id. at
276-77; see also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 523, 526 (1987) ("[It frustrates
rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers
the statute's primary objective must be the law."). According to Professor Posner, the
alternative to both arguments would enforce the legislative deal contained within the
statute, an alternative rife with its own difficulties. POSNER, supra note 16, at 277-78.
38 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 901.
39 POSNER, supra note 16, at 255.
40 See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 32 (stating
that "purposivism founders on the unwieldy generality of its questions."); Sunstein &
Vermeule, supra note 20, at 901.
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and consistency with other provisions within the statute as their
interpretive guides.4'
Textualists tend to fall within one of two camps: soft and hard
plain meaning advocates (or textualists and new textualists).42 Those
who simply start with the language of the statute, but may go on to con-
sider other types of evidence, including legislative history, represent soft
plain meaning textualists. Justice Day, writing the majority opinion
in Caminetti v. United States, explained:
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in
the first instance, be sought in the language in which the
act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within
the constitutional authority of the law-making body which
passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.43
Nevertheless, Justice Day allowed-albeit somewhat hesitantly-
that extrinsic evidence may at times be considered and that even plain
language may at times be rejected:
Reports to Congress accompanying the introduction of pro-
posed laws may aid the courts in reaching the true mean-
ing of the legislature in cases of doubtful interpretation.
But, as we have already said, and it has been so often
affirmed as to become a recognized rule, when words are
free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression
of the legislative intent .... In other words, the language
being plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracti-
41 See Mullins, supra note 12, at 21.
2See ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at
223-30. Textualists of both camps apply the "plain meaning rule." Plain meaning advo-
cates ask "given the ordinary meanings of words and accepted precepts of grammar and
syntax, what does the provision signify to the reasonable person?" ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 38. A close cousin of the plain meaning
rule is Justice Holmes's "normal English speaker" test. Under the Holmes test the inter-
preter asks "not what [the author] meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth
of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV L. REv. 417,417-18
(1899).
In addition to the two camps identified, several additional theories oftextualism
exist, including: structural textualism, pragmatic textualism, radical textualism, and
sympathetic textualism. Mullins, supra note 12, at 22.
" Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
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cable consequences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate
legislative intent.4
Although appealing, a flaw of the soft plain meaning approach is
that it may not take us very far. As the Caminetti decision acknowl-
edged, if the language is indeed unambiguous, there really is no need for
interpretation at all: that is, "[wihere the language is plain and admits
of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise
and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."45
And, if the language of the statute is ambiguous,46 in light of the context
or otherwise, the soft plain meaning approach tends to fall back on
legislative intent.
Unlike the soft plain meaning approach, those who use plain mean-
ing as the beginning and end of statutory interpretation fall into the
hard plain meaning camp (often referred to as the "new textualists").47
Prominent new textualists, such as Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge
44 Id. at 490 (citations omitted).
4'Id. at 485. In dissent, Justice McKenna raised this concern directly:
Undoubtedly in the investigation of the meaning of a statute we resort
first to its words, and when clear they are decisive. The principle has
attractive and seemingly disposing simplicity, but that it is not easy of
application or, at least, encounters other principles, many cases dem-
onstrate. The words of a statute may be uncertain in their signification
or in their application. If the words be ambiguous, the problem they
present is to be resolved by their definition; the subject-matter and the
lexicons become our guides. But here, even, we are not exempt from
putting ourselves in the place of the legislators. If the words be clear in
meaning but the objects to which they are addressed be uncertain, the
problem then is to determine the uncertainty. And for this a realization
of conditions that provoked the statute must inform our judgment.
Id. at 496 (McKenna, J., dissenting). Moreover, from a practical perspective, the easy
cases-where "the statutory text provides a plain or clear answer" to a controversy-
"generally do not reach the appellate courts." MIKvA & LANE, supra note 16, at 10. Impor-
tant exceptions exist where rigid application leads to unconstitutional or senseless (or
in some cases unreasonable) consequences. Id.; see also Farber, supra note 26, at 289;
POSNER, supra note 16, at 265 (referring to the latter exception as "civilizing
interpretations").
46 Frequent statutory ambiguities may arise from the legislative drafting process because
(1) there are multiple drafters, each with different perspectives, strategies, and goals;
(2) statutory drafting is "often a rushed and careless process", POSNER, supra note 16,
at 268; and (3) in at least some cases, some drafters seek to add rather than avoid
ambiguity. See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at
38.47 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 228.
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Frank Easterbrook, focus predominantly on what Congress said (the
words of the statutory text) and give very little, if any, weight to what
Congress had in mind (legislative intent).48 Professor Stanley Fish
explains that these textualists "insist that what an interpreter seeks
to establish is the meaning of the text as it exists apart from anyone's
intention."49
Textualism's appeal rests on its apparent transparency, objectiv-
ity and concrete practicality; while its legitimacy rests, at least in part,
on its conformity with democratic process values. As to the first quality,
Professor Eskridge explains that "textualism appeals to the rule of law
value that citizens ought to be able to read the statute books and know
their rights and duties. " 5° As for objectivity, a powerful draw of the new
textualist approach turns on its ability (or seeming ability) to constrain
judicial law and policymaking by limiting judicial imposition of subjec-
tive preferences."' Judges who follow well-established rules of grammar,
syntax, and judicial cannons of construction are less free to contrive policy.
Further, textualism may avoid the fruitless task of searching for legis-
lative meaning where none exists." Finally, on the point of legitimacy,
only the statutory text itself has gone through the mandated democratic
procedural rigors of legal enactment.53
Nevertheless, textualism, particularly the renaissance of new
textualism, has spawned a considerable bevy of critics. The harshest
critics argue new textualism, by putting the cart (meaning) before the
horse (intention), makes little sense. According to Professor Stanley Fish,
the textualists have it "backwards"5' . "[i]ntention comes first; language,
' Judge Easterbrook writes: "The meaning of statutes is to be found not in the subjective,
multiple mind of Congress but in the understanding of the objectively reasonable person."
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 65 (1988). A distinction between intentionalists and textualists is
that textualists embrace a "reader-centered" strategy for attributing meaning to statutory
text, whereas intentionalists adopt a "writer-centered" strategy. See Mullins, supra
note 12, at 25.
49 Along these lines, Professor Fish cites Justice Scalia in saying "it is what is 'said,' not
what is 'meant,' that is 'the object of [the court's) inquiry.'" Fish, supra note 19, at A25.
50 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 34.
51 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at
229; Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 15, at 416.
52 See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 16, 34.
" Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 15, at 416 ("Statutory terms-not legislative
history, not legislative purpose, not legislative 'intent'-have gone through the constitu-
tionally specified procedures for the enactment of law.").
5' Fish, supra note 19, at A25.
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and with it the possibility of meaning, second."" As a consequence,
Professor Fish asserts "there can be no 'textualist' method, because there
is no object-no text without writerly intention-to which would-be
textualists could be faithful." 6 Less harsh critics, relying on similar
arguments, argue that the textualists' failure to consider context will, in
any case, occasionally result in "interpretive blunders."57
Along similar lines, Professor Posner points out that the plain
meaning approach ignores arguments of external ambiguity," and in so
doing "artificially truncates the interpretive process."59 In this view, the
problem for plain meaning advocates is that:
A normal English speaker does not interpret a message
merely by consulting the dictionary definitions of each
word ... and the relevant grammatical and syntactical
principles. He does not ignore... external ambiguity. He
consults the totality of his relevant experience .... Mean-
ing depends on context as well as on the semantic and other
formal properties of sentences. The effort to avoid grappling
with the things of the world in ascertaining meaning is a
formalist dodge . ... 'o
55 d.
5 1 Id. As an example, Professor Fish offers us the example of a rock formation with mark-
ings that appear to spell the word "help." Assuming the interpreter is convinced the marks
are language, the interpreter still cannot know, even by closely scrutinizing the word,
whether it's "a message from a person in distress," directions for assistance (look here
for help), "a petition to God," or "a reference to a Beatles song." Id. Accordingly, he
concludes that "while the text as written can be a piece of evidence, it cannot-just as
that rock formation cannot-be self-sufficient and conclusive evidence." Id. See also
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 15, at 416 (noting that the "central problem
[with new textualism] is that the meaning of words (whether'plain' or not) depends on both
culture and context") (emphasis in original).
" Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 15, at 417. Professor Sunstein argues that
"[s]tatutory terms are not self-defining, and words have no meaning before or without
interpretation." Id. at 416. Like Fish, he asserts that we need background norms to make
reliance on text an intelligible concept, but also that simple reliance on text can result
in blunders. Id. at 416-17.
5 An "external ambiguity" exists "when the sentence, though clear to a normal English
speaker ignorant of its background, is unclear, garbled, or means something different
from what the normal English speaker thinks to someone who does know the back-
ground." POSNER, supra note 16, at 264 (emphasis in original).
59 Id.60 Id. at 268-69.
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In essence, statutory meaning does not reside in the text alone.6'
On a less theoretical level, Professor Posner points out a temporal
conundrum of textualism. Should interpreters rely on a word's well-
understood meaning at the time of the enactment or at the time of the
legal controversy? Looking back gives weight to the original legislature's
meaning (how the original drafters wrote the law), but over time can
impose rigidity in the statute's application and constrains current readers'
ability to read for plain meaning.6 2 On the flip side, giving text its
contemporary meaning may correlate better with current public
understanding (how the targeted community reads the law) and present-
day conditions, but may have little connection to the meaning of the text
as enacted.6 3 Furthermore, textualism provides no consistent answer for
choosing which temporal option should prevail,64 fostering indeterminacy
and leading directly to the next criticism.
Critics assert that new textualism engenders a false sense of
objective determinacy. That is, in hard cases textualism can be equally
as subjective and indeterminate as intentionalism and yet all the while
seem fixed and transparent.6" In this sense textualism is arguably nothing
but a wolf in sheep's clothing.66 For example, the new textualists lean
61 According to Richard Posner, this is the central objection to the plain-meaning rule. Id.
at 296. Contrary to the plain meaning rule, "[m] eaning is what emerges when linguistic
and cultural understandings and experiences are brought to bear on the text." Id.
62 Professor Posner provides the following relevant example: "A statute imposes a duty
on imported vegetables but not on imported fruits, and the question arises whether the
duty applies to tomatoes." Id. at 263. Further, he supposes that "in 1883, when the
statute was passed, everyone classified tomatoes as fruits, [but] today everyone classifies
them as vegetables." Id. Which definition should govern the interpretation? Reliance on
the 1883 meaning gives today's reader little chance to understand the statutory
directives as the public at large would not be expected to research the definitions at the
time of enactment. Id.63 Again using Professor Posner's tomato fruit-versus-vegetable example, the interpreter's
reliance on today's meaning gives short shrift to the statute's meaning when enacted. Id.
Professor Posner describes this problem as "semantic drift." Id. at 264. See also Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes, supra note 15, at 422-23.
64 POSNER, supra note 16, at 263; Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 15, at 419;
see Farber, supra note 26, at 312-13.
65 Professor Eskridge argues that, "[I]ike intentionalism and purposivism, textualism...
does not yield determinate answers or meaningfully constrain the interpreter in hard
cases." ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 34. More-
over, Professor Eskridge asserts that "textualism cannot rigorously be tied to majority
preferences... and is not an accurate description of what agencies and courts actually
do when they interpret statutes." Id.
66 For example, in Rapanos v. United States, the dissenters mock Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion for relying heavily on dictionary meanings to narrow statutory
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heavily on canons of statutory construction as a means to apply fixed
rules to decipher text in accordance with the rule of law. 7 The canons,
however, have long held the notorious reputation of being both subjective
as well as indeterminate.6" In the 1950's, Karl Llewellyn famously attacked
the canons as a faqade for judicially imposed statutory meaning (judicial
policymaking) by asserting that "there are two opposing canons on almost
every point."69 More recently, Professor Eskridge pointed out that for most
every general canon there exists a counter-canon, or exception, leading
to indeterminacy.7" Thus, according to Professor Posner,
like their counterparts, the maxims of ordinary life ('haste
makes waste,' but 'he who hesitates is lost'), the canons are
the collective folk wisdom of statutory interpretation and
they no more enable difficult questions of interpretation to
be answered than the maxims of everyday life enable the
difficult problems of everyday living to be solved.7'
For these reasons, despite its initial appeal, textualism can come
across not only as indeterminate but also as intellectually dishonest.
meaning of "waters of the United States" while overlooking other dictionary meanings
that contradict their approach:
It is unclear how the plurality reached this conclusion, though it plainly
neglected to consult a dictionary. Even its preferred Webster's Second
defines the term [adjacent] as '[1]ying near, close, or contiguous; neigh-
boring; bordering on' and acknowledges that '[olbjects are Adjacent
when they lie close to each other, but not necessarily in actual contact.'
In any event, the proper question is not how the plurality would define
'adjacent,' but whether the Corps' definition is reasonable.
126 S. Ct. 2208, 2263 (2006).
67 Mank, supra note 24, at 527 ("Textualist judges often use traditional 'canons' of statu-
tory construction when interpreting a statute's text.").
68 See POSNER, supra note 16, at 279 ("The plain-meaning rule and the other 'canons of
construction' are the subject of a large and, on the whole, negative literature.").
69 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401 (1950). Similarly,
Professor Mank argues that textualist judges selectively and inappropriately favor some
canons at the expense of others. Mank, supra note 24, at 527.
70 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 280.
"' POSNER, supra note 16, at 280.
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C. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation
Dynamic statutory interpretation represents yet a third category
of approaches. Dynamic statutory interpretation encompasses, for its
adherents, both a descriptive explanation of what courts actually do and
a prescriptive theory of what courts should do with respect to statutory
interpretation.72 As described by Professor Eskridge,
interpretation is dynamic, in the sense that the meaning of
a statute will change as social context changes, as new inter-
preters grapple with the statute, and as the political context
changes.., the story of a statute becomes a small part of
the larger web of institutions and practices in a society.
73
Professor Eskridge, therefore, offers guidelines for appropriate ordering
of interpretive models along a continuum and places the "evolutive con-
text" first when "neither the text nor the historical context of the statute
clearly resolves the interpretive question, and the societal and legal con-
text of the statute has changed materially," especially where the statute
is old, the language general, and the societal changes drastic.74 As a re-
sult, "[tihe interpretation of a statutory provision ... is not necessarily
the one which the original legislature would have endorsed, and as the
distance between enactment and interpretation increases, a pure origi-
nalist inquiry becomes impossible and/or irrelevant."75
Under a dynamic approach, statutory interpretation is not static
(nor should it be), but rather flexible and fluid in application over time.76
Statutes-"like the Constitution and the common law-[are to] be inter-
preted 'dynamically,'... in light of their present societal, political, and
legal context."77 As professors Sunstein and Vermeule so succinctly de-
scribes it, "[r] ather than adhering either to ordinary meaning at the time
of enactment, or even to legislative intent conceived in strictly originalist
terms," dynamic interpretation would have courts "'update' statutes by
72 ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1994, supra note 12, at 6. For an
expansive list of scholarship supporting these various theses, see id. at 336 n.19.73 Id. at 199.
74 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1496 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 19871.
15 Id. at 1497.
76 ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 237.
" Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 1987, supra note 74, at 1479.
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intelligent adaptation of original purposes to new social circumstances,
and by taking account of changes in the overall fabric of public law" while
restraining themselves within the "clear contrary instructions" of the
legislature.78 Professor Aleinikoff likens this approach to that of a
ship at sea:
Congress builds a ship and charts its initial course, but the
ship's ports-of-call, safe harbors and ultimate destination
may be a product of the ship's captain, the weather, and
other factors not identified at the time the ship sets sail.
This model understands a statute as an on-going process
(a voyage) in which both the shipbuilder and subsequent
navigators play a role. The dimensions and structure of the
craft determine where it is capable of going, but the current
course is set primarily by the crew on board. (Of course,
Congress may send subsequent messages to the ship or
change the waters in which the ship is sailing. )79
Accordingly, dynamic statutory interpretation makes most sense where
the textual meaning is uncertain and the statute out of date (due to the
passage of time and major shifts in societal norms and values).8 0 Never-
theless, even advocates of the dynamic model retain statutory text as
determinative where the statute is recent, the text detailed, "and the
context of enactment represents considered legislative deliberation and
decision on the interpretive issue."s l
The major criticisms of dynamic interpretation include its encroach-
ment into legislative branch authority; 2 its apparent antidemocratic,
"countermajoritarian" bias;83 and its failure to take into account the falli-
bility of judges and the limited capabilities of courts."s And, going one
7 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 905.
79 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21 (1988).
80 See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 1987, supra note 74, at 1484.
81 Id. at 1496.
82 Id. at 1497 ("The formalist argument is that the creation of law by federal judges is
beyond the authority given them in the Constitution, for it trenches upon the lawmaking
power given to Congress.").
83 Id. at 1498 ("The traditional legal process argument is that such judicial lawmaking
is 'countermajoritarian' and so ought to be avoided in a democracy, where important
policy decisions ought to be made by the majoritarian branches of government.").
4 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 905. In this regard, Professors Sunstein and
Vermeule assert that "[d]ynamic statutory interpretation, it turns out, embodies the
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step further, that even defensible judicial updating might have perni-
cious side effects on legislative behavior."5
D. Administrative Agency Deference
Yet a fourth approach to statutory interpretation places great and
often controlling weight on administrative agency determinations of
statutory meaning."6 Administrative agency deference represents, in a
sense, an overlay applied in concert with other approaches (in situations
where intentionalism and/or textualism approaches fail).
Agency deference has roots in the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA),"7 which sets forth a standard of review for courts hearing chal-
lenges to agency regulations. According to the APA, courts review admin-
istrative agency rulemaking under an arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse
of discretion standard."8 The Supreme Court confirmed the deferential
nature of this standard in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council. 9 According to Chevron, reviewing courts look first to
the express intent of Congress regarding the precise question, which if
clear and unambiguous controls the outcome."s However, "if the statute
nirvana fallacy-the juxtaposition of an idealized picture of judicial capacities with a
grudging picture of the capacities of other actors in the interpretive system." Id.
85 Id.
86 See Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 15, at 444-46.
7Public Law No. 89-554,80 Stat. 381 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559
(2000)). Note the weight given to agency interpretations is not always controlling and the
courts can and do reject them on occasion. See, e.g., Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716
F. Supp. 479,483 (W.D. Wash. 1988) ("The Court will reject conclusory assertions of agency
'expertise' where the agency spurns unrebutted expert opinions without itself offering
a credible alternative explanation.").
88 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). Under the APA, the courts' roles are further constrained
by review on the administrative record. See Vic Sher, Breaking Out of the Box: Toxic Risk,
Government Actions, and Constitutional Rights, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 145, 147 (1998).
First, the APA limits the court to determining only whether the agency's
action was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law, or was taken without observance of pro-
cedures required by law.' Second, the APA limits the court's inquiry to
the appropriateness of the agency's decision in light of the record before
the agency.
Id.
89 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Courtes approach to judicial review has been at times referred to
as the "Chevron two-step." JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENvIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 62 (2d ed. 2007).
90 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
20081
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," the court defers
to the administrative interpretation, unless the agency's construction is
"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."91
Justifications for agency deference rest on two, somewhat conflict-
ing, notions: agency expertise and participatory government. According
to the popular "scientific expertise" model of administrative law, agency
scientists and technocrats (e.g., agency chemists, biologists, statisticians
and managers) consider statutes based on professional judgment rather
than, and insulated from, partisan political influence.92 This model envi-
sions rational decisionmaking by impartial experts. Especially in the field
of environmental law, the model ideally generates statutory interpreta-
tions grounded in objective scientific principles rather than the vagaries
of partisan politics. Although federal judges also serve independently
of the electorate, in most cases they lack the knowledge of chemical, bio-
logical, and physical sciences of administrative experts.93
Another justification for administrative agency deference rests on
notions of democratic accountability. First, in contrast to judicial decisions,
informal agency rulemaking (the primary forum for agency statutory in-
terpretation) opens decisionmaking to public scrutiny and public input
before statutory interpretations become final.94 Second, administrative
agencies are at least arguably more accountable to the public than un-
elected judges by virtue of being situated within the executive branch of
government, where high ranking agency officials serve at the will of the
elected President, the Chief Executive.9" Along similar lines, congressional
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.").
9 Id. at 843-44.
92 SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 89, at 59-60.
9' In Chevron, the Court expressly asserts this point by stating, "Judges are not experts
in the field...." 467 U.S. at 865.
9' Specifically, the APA requires public notice of proposed rulemaking and opportunity
for public comment prior to final adoption. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
9 The Chevron Court relied, in part, on this rationale for deference:
Judges ... are not part of either political branch of the Government....
In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely
upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people,
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices ....
467 U.S. at 866. Agency actions are also subject to presidential review pursuant to
executive orders and informal pressures.
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oversight of administrative agency rulemaking arguably makes adminis-
trative agency action more democratically accountable than determina-
tions by unelected judges, even if only indirectly so.
Academic scholars have identified several defects in both the expert
and the accountability rationales for agency deference. First, although
"expert" agencies ideally act as objective, impartial professionals, critics
perceive a systematic bias by agencies in favor of the regulated community
and against the public good.9" Scholars explain this bias (often referred
to as agency capture), as the result of individual and institutional self-
interest (e.g., self-promotion or agency turf battles) and/or by public choice
theory.97 Second, it is disputable whether agencies are demonstrably more
accountable to the public than the judiciary given that agency scien-
tists and staff-like judges-are not elected and often stay on with an
agency beyond the terms of any particular party's control over
governmental affairs.98
These oppositional criticisms-agencies are neither truly independ-
ent nor truly democratically accountable-suggest that administrative
agencies do not fit neatly within either the agency as "expert" or agency
as "mini-legislature" models, but rather fall somewhere between the two.
96 Scholars even question the independence of"independent" agencies, those seemingly buff-
ered from the President's influence. See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory
State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 426-27 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Paradoxes].
[Tihe fact is that independent agencies are not independent at all.
Indeed, such agencies are highly responsive to shifts in political opinion
and even to the views of the President.... The independent agencies
have generally been highly susceptible to the political pressure of well-
organized private groups-perhaps even more susceptible, on balance,
than executive agencies.
Id.
97 SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 89, at 59-60. Public choice theory rests heavily on
the assumption that humans are "self-interested utility maximizers and that maximization
may be measured economically." BRIAN CZECH & PAUL R. KRAUSMAN, THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACTS: HISTORY, CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 35 (2001). In the
regulatory context, Professor Sunstein has noted that "[a] large literature, inspired by
public choice theory and welfare economics, has grown up around the theory that pur-
portedly public-interested regulation is almost always an effort to create a cartel or
to serve some private interest at the public expense." Sunstein, Paradoxes, supra note
96, at 407.
98 For some back and forth on this issue, see Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1550 (1992) (discussing
limited political branch oversight of agency decisions and the professional rather than
political nature of career staff influence over agency action, but nevertheless finding courts
more politically insulated than agencies).
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As a consequence, the rationales for agency deference-being neither here
nor there-lose much of their forcefulness.
Even if either rationale strongly justified adoption of agency inter-
pretations, judicial application of agency deference arguably suffers from
deficiencies applicable to other methods of interpretation. Agency defer-
ence, seemingly objective and rational, may be readily adopted by
judges when the agency outcome matches the desired outcome or easily
rejected when it does not. Specifically, judges may adopt an agency
interpretation they favor by citing to Chevron deference or reject an agency
interpretation they disfavor either by stopping at Chevron's step one,99 or
simply failing to apply Chevron at all.'
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ESA
The history of the federal government's endangered species con-
servation efforts began tentatively in the late 1800s and emerged more
emphatically, close to a century later, with passage of endangered species
legislation." 1 In 1872, Congress preserved Yellowstone National Park0 2
in response, at least in part, to the extirpation of bison from most of their
historic range.0 3 Several decades later, Congress passed the Lacey Act of
1900104 in response to concern about the precipitous decline of formerly
abundant bird species, including the passenger pigeon."' In 1940, the
99 See SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 89, at 64.
o See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
970 (1992).
101 Between British colonization and passage of the ESA, more than 500 North American
species became extinct, including certain populations and subspecies of beaver, elk, auk,
duck, sea mink, pigeon, and parakeet. CZECH & KRAUSMAN, supra note 97, at 8-11.
102 Act of May 7, 1894, ch. 72, 28 Stat. 73, 73-75 (1894).
103 See CZECH & KRAUSMAN, supra note 97, at 8 ("The destruction of the buffalo herds
made wildlife protection a public issue. In fact, Yellowstone National Park was created
in 1872 partly for the purpose of preserving bison and other ungulates that had become
rare elsewhere.") (citation omitted). For a closer examination of the relationship between
the plight of the bison, federal wildlife law, and the history of endangered species protec-
tions in the United States, see SHANNON PETERSEN, ACTING FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES:
THE STATUTORY ARK 3-20 (2002).
'o4 Lacey Act of 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2000
& Supp. III 2003) and 18 U.S.C. § 42 (2000)).
1 05 MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EvOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW
193 (3d ed. 1997) ("Debates that preceded passage of the Lacey Act in 1900 reveal that
Congress was distressed about the virtual extermination of the passenger pigeon and the
drastic depletion of many other bird species."); see also Michael J. Bean, Historical
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United States entered into a prescient and rather innovative treaty to pro-
tect species and habitats in the Western Hemisphere, °6 but implementation
faltered and fell dormant following the outbreak of World War II shortly
thereafter.'° 7 A quarter century later, Congress put forward three increas-
ingly stringent legislative efforts expressly targeting endangered species.
First came the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966,108 closely
followed by the amendments of the Endangered Species Conservation Act
of 1969.109 Both gave way to a third and more radical110 legislative effort:
passage of the Endangered Species Act of 1973."'
A. Endangered Species Act Precursors
Congress enacted the Endangered Species Preservation Act of
1966112 ("ESPA") to put in place a program for "conserving, protecting,
restoring, and propagating selected species.., threatened with extinc-
tion."" 3 Towards these goals, core provisions of the ESPA formally autho-
rized federal agency habitat conservation through land acquisition" 4 and
the putting together of a list of native endangered species." 5 However,
this early precursor to the current ESA neither restricted taking of at-
risk species nor barred sale of such species in interstate commerce." 6
Further, the ESPA neither prohibited destruction of habitat essential to
such species nor did it provide protection to any non-native species." 7
Even to the extent the ESPA called for other federal agency efforts, it
Background to the Endangered Species Act, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY,
AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 11, at 11, 12-13; PETERSEN, supra note 103, at 11.
106 Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemi-
sphere, opened for signature Oct. 24, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354, 161 U.N.T.S. 193).
107 See Bean, supra note 105, at 11, 14.
108 Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed 1973).
109 Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969).
110 Holly Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow Escape for a Broad New Law, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 109,113 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005)
[hereinafter Doremus, Narrow Escape] (describing passage of the ESA as a radical change
in strategy).
111 Pub. L. No. 93-205,87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000)).
112 Pub. L. No. 89-669, § 1(a), 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed 1973).
"'Id. § 2(a), 80 Stat. at 926.
"
4 Id. § 2(b)-(c), 80 Stat. at 927.
'
T hId. § 2(c), 80 Stat. at 926.
116 BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 105, at 195-96.
117 See Bean, supra note 105, at 15.
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softened these calls by including as "practical" and "consistent with"
caveats. 118 As consequence, the ESPA was "a broad but toothless policy."
19
Congress addressed some of these program gaps with passage of
the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969 ("ESCA"). 20 The ESCA
expanded the listing process to cover species in danger of "worldwide
extinction" (adding coverage for non-native species)' 2 ' and expanded
federal agency authority for acquiring lands for habitat conservation
purposes.122 In short, the ESCA shifted federal policy toward a more
stringent and more global effort by adding a broad prohibition on imports
of many listed species' 23 ; requiring listing decisions in accord with
federal APA rulemaking procedures124; and directing the Secretary of the
Interior to work internationally for species conservation. 25
B. Endangered Species Act of 1973
Congress made several large leaps towards a comprehensive
program of species conservation with passage of the Endangered Species
Act of 1973. Upon signing the Act into law, then-President Nixon opined
that the lives of future generations would be richer and the country "more
beautiful in the years ahead" due to passage of the ESA. 126 The Supreme
Court described the ESA as "the most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation."127 The
118 CZECH & KRAUSMAN, supra note 97, at 21.
119 Id. (quoting DANIEL J. RoHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS
PROTECTIONS AND IMPLICATION 21 (Stanford Environmental Law Society 1989).
120 Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (repealed 1973).
'
211d. § 2, 83 Stat. at 275. Congress did not, however, prohibit all imports of endangered
wildlife. For example, the Act expressly allowed importation of species for certain zoological,
educational, scientific, propagation and hardship reasons. Id. § 3(b), 83 Stat. at 276.122 Id. § 12(b)-(c), 83 Stat. at 282.
12 Id. § 2, 83 Stat. at 275.
124 Id. § 3(a), 83 Stat. at 275.
125 Id. § 5(b), 83 Stat. at 278. The United States signed the resulting Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES") on March
3, 1973. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into
force July 1, 1975). As a consequence of the timing of the convention negotiations, many
definitions contained in the ESA were influenced by and/or come directly from UN and
IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature) glossaries, including but not
limited to CITES definitions. See BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 105, at 200.
126 See Bean, supra note 105, at 17.
127 TVAv. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978). See also Holly Doremus, Comment, Patching the
Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265,265 (1991)
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ESA is also described in less lofty terms as "something like a pit bull on
a firm leash."2 ' The 1973 Act stands out today both for its purportedly
toothy conditions in the service of species protection 12 and for its repu-
tation for generating vicious controversy.
13
As amended, the ESA contains a dozen or so program elements,
with the listing, consultation and restrictive take provisions of sections
4, 7, and 9 considered by many to be the heart and soul of the Act. 131 For
the purpose of generating some context for the latter parts of this
Article, this Part provides a brief description of ESA sections 7 and 8(a).
C. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973
The ESA's now-famed section 7 "no jeopardy" requirement falls
under the seemingly innocuous title of "Interagency cooperation." 32 As
originally enacted, section 7 established an interagency consultation
process for federal actions with the potential to jeopardize the existence
[hereinafter Doremus, Patching the Ark] (noting ESA is "widely regarded as the strongest
legislation ever devised for the protection of nonhuman species").
128 J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885, 886
(2003). Less-reserved scholars simply refer to the ESA as the "pit bull" of environmental
law sans any mention of a restraining leash. JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW AND POLICY 341 (2004) ("The ESA has been called 'the pit bull' of environmental law
and it is controversial for the simple reason that it has real teeth that can bite hard, though
how hard the law actually bites in practice is strongly contested."). Authors Donald Baur
and William Robert Irvin attribute the "pit bull" analogy to Assistant Secretary of the Interior
Donald Barry. Donald C. Baur & William Robert Irvin, Introduction, in ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 11, at xviii. Shannon Petersen
credits Senator Bob Graham with similar comments. PETERSEN, supra note 103, at ix
("Although the ESA may be the 'crown jewel of the nation's environmental laws,' it has also
been the 'pit bull of environmental laws.'") (citing Endangered Species Act Amendments
of 1993: Hearing on S. 921 Before the Subcomm. on Clean Water, Fisheries and Wildlife
of the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 103d Cong. 2 (1994) (statement of
Sen. Bob Graham, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Clean Water, Fisheries and Wildlife)).
129 The Endangered Species Act is "widely regarded as the strongest legislation ever
devised for the protection of nonhuman species." Doremus, Protecting theArk, supra note
127, at 265.
130 Since its enactment, "the ESA has become the center of bitter debate among envi-
ronmentalists, farmers, resource users, and landowners." Nancy Kubasek et al., The
Endangered Species Act: Time for a New Approach?, 24 ENvTL. L. 329, 329-30 (1994).
131 See PETERSEN, supra note 103, at ix (identifying sections 4, 7, and 9 as foundational);
J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA: The Keystone of Species Protection Law, in ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 11, at 19 (identifying section
4 as the keystone of the ESA).
132 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000).
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of either listed species or their critical habitat. In exact terms, the
provision stated:
All other Federal departments and agencies shall, in con-
sultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary,
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of
this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation
of endangered species and threatened species listed pur-
suant to section 1533 of this title and by taking such action
necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or car-
ried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence
of such endangered species and threatened species or
result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such
species which is determined by the Secretary, after con-
sultation as appropriate with the affected States, to be
critical. 1
33
Although as highlighted, the compulsory nature of the statutory language
of this provision appears straightforward, many scholars concede that
most of the legislators were not aware of the broad scope of the provisions
of the Act at the time of enactment.' Although Congress passed the ESA
virtually unanimously,' it "debated little over the various provisions." 36
The "few congressional concerns" that did arise did not center on sections
4, 7, 8, or 9, but rather on "issues relatively inconsequential to later
developments."' 3 ' Potential explanations for the lack of congressional
attention include the social context of the times (broad public support of
environmental initiatives at a time of national divisiveness), 31 little to
133 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. III 1973) (emphasis added).
134 See Doremus,Narrow Escape, supra note 110, at 113 ("[Ilt is widely agreed that most
legislators were not aware of the full scope of the ESA when they voted for it."); PETERSEN,
supra note 103, at 31 ("Members of Congress ... failed to anticipate many of the act's
consequences.") Along these lines are the comments of the legislators themselves. Don
Young (R-Alaska), former chairmen of the House Resources Committee, said, "[We] envi-
sioned trying to protect, you know, pigeons and things like that. We never thought about
mussels and ferns and flowers and all these subspecies of squirrels and birds." B. J.
Bergman, Leader of the Pack, SIERRA MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 51, 54.
135 The ESA passed unanimously in the Senate and overwhelmingly in the House (a mere
twelve dissenters). 119 Cong. Rec. 25694, 30167-68 (1973).
136 PETERSEN, supra note 103, at 28.
137 Id.
13
' Id. at 30; see also CZECH & KRAusMAN, supra note 97, at 23 ("The early 1970s saw a
wave of environmental regulatory lawmaking, of which ESA represented the crest.").
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non-existent corporate or other opposition,'139 a certain level of scientific
ignorance, 4 ° and a view that the ESA would be largely symbolic.141 With
respect to section 7 in particular, Congress paid little if any attention to
the language of the bill before it. 4 2 For these reasons, section 7 may be
categorized as a sleeper provision.
A number of commentators, however, have also recognized the
stealthiness of section 7.143 It has come to light that staffers strategically
worked in the strong language, under cover of otherwise convoluted pro-
cedural wording, unbeknownst to many of the enacting legislators. Thus,
in its legislative promulgation,
the ESA's action provisions were formulated in a process
of legislative obscurity by a small group of scientists and
legislative activists... who saw a need and an opportunity
for more effective protections and went about building
them into the nooks and crannies of an otherwise rather
innocuous and generalized regulatory law focused on
poaching and trade restrictions. 1
For instance, although early versions of the consultation pro-
vision called only for "'practicable' steps to conserve listed species[,]...
a handful of White House and Congressional staffers reworked the bill,
introducing a firm prohibition on federal actions that would jeopardize
listed species."'45 Nevertheless, members of Congress "almost completely
139 See PETERSEN, supra note 103, at 30-31.
140 Id. at 34.
141 Specifically, Petersen notes that "[miost individuals in Congress and the Nixon admin-
istration believed the ESA to be a largely symbolic effort to protect charismatic megafauna
representative of our national heritage, like bald eagles, bison, and grizzly bears." Id. at 34.
According to Petersen, "[f] ew if any [members of Congress] believed at the time that the
ESA would protect seemingly insignificant species irrespective of economic considerations,
halt federal development projects, and regulate private property." Id.
142 Petersen notes that "Congress almost completely ignored section 7's requirement of
interagency cooperation, presumably because they found that section relatively unimpor-
tant or uncontroversial." Id. at 33. Petersen concedes, however, that a question concerning
section 7's scope did arise at least once in committee, but was apparently put to rest by
Senator Tunney's understanding that section 7 mandated consultation, but not agency
action. Id.
'4See, e.g., Plater, supra note 7, at 292. The implications of the provision fell not only below
the radar of Congress, but also of special interests groups and entities likely to have
opposed it. See Petersen, supra note 103, at 31.
'" Plater, supra note 7, at 292.
145 Doremus, Narrow Escape, supra note 110, at 113.
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ignored section 7's requirement of interagency cooperation, presumably
because they found that section relatively unimportant or uncontrover-
sial."146 Apparently, the full regulatory implications and extent of the
provision avoided close (or any meaningful) congressional scrutiny by
design. 147 Consequently, the ESA's original consultation provision also
falls squarely within the sub-category of a stealth provision.
D. Section 8a of the Endangered Species Act of 1973
Sections 8 and 8a set forth international components of the ESA.
Of particular relevance for this Article, section 8a mandates implemen-
tation of the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation
in the Western Hemisphere ("Western Convention"). 14 By marrying fed-
eral and international authorities, section 8a calls for regulatory initia-
tives to conserve wildlife and habitat in partnership with other nations.
Specifically, section 8a provides:
The Secretary of the Interior. . . , in cooperation
with the Secretary of State, shall act on behalf of, and rep-
resent, the United States in all regards as required by the
Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation
in the Western Hemisphere....
The Secretary and the Secretary of State shall, in
cooperation with the contracting parties to the Western
Convention and, to the extent feasible and appropriate,
with the participation of State agencies, take such steps as
are necessary to implement the Western Convention.'49
Long overlooked and underutilized, section 8a appears to be not
only a temporarily-dormant sleeper imbued with great potential for
146 Petersen, supra note 103, at 33.
147 See Plater, supra note 7, at 292. "According to Curtis Bohlen, Undersecretary of
Interior at the time, '[Tihere were probably not more than four of us who understood its
ramifications.'" Doremus, Narrow Escape, supra note 110, at 113-14 (quoting CHARLES
C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES 160
(1995)). Similarly, speaking at a national conference held at Lewis & Clark School of Law,
Gerard A. Bertrand, one of the provision drafters, disclosed that the stealth wording
existed by design. Dr. Gerard A. Bertrand, Presentation at the Lewis & Clark Law School
Symposium: The ESA Turns 30 (October 2003).
148 16 U.S.C. § 1537a(e) (2000).
"1 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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tackling worldwide species declines, but yet another stealth provision
hidden in plain sight and lying in wait for judicial activation. 50
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF AN ESA STEALTH PROVISION
This part of the Article examines a vast array of approaches used
to interpret just one of the ESA's stealth provisions in just one case
before the federal courts. The provision is section 7. The statutory
interpretations arise in none other than the legendary Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill ("TVA v. Hill")case,'5' and its associated lower court
rulings,152 where, as the story goes, a few tiny fish blocked the opening of
the mighty Tellico Dam (at least for a short while). 3 The federal court
decisions, taken together, illustrate the unpredictable and seemingly
fickle approaches to interpretation of statutory stealth provisions.
A. Interpreting the ESA's Section 7 Stealth Provision
The controversy in TVA v. Hill centered on discovery of a small
fish (the snail darter, Percina (Imostoma) tanasi) immediately down-
stream of the nearly completed, multimillion dollar federal dam
project.' In 1966 Congress approved, and in 1967 Congress appropri-
ated funds for, a "multipurpose regional development project" on the
scenic Little Tennessee River to encourage shoreline development,
generate electricity, provide recreation, enhance flood control, and improve
local economic conditions. 55 The Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA")
150 Speaking at a national conference held at Lewis & Clark School of Law, Dr. Gerard A.
Bertrand, one of the primary drafters, declared that aside from section 7, the ESA con-
tained hidden, powerful, yet-to-be-discovered statutory language. Dr. Gerard A. Bertrand,
Presentation at the Lewis & Clark Law School Symposium: The ESA Turns 30 (October
2003). In follow-up correspondence, Dr. Bertand identified one yet-untapped provision as
section 8a. E-mail from Gerard A. Bertrand, President Emeritus, Massachusetts Audubon
Society, to Madeline June Kass, Assistant Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of
Law (Jan. 27, 2004, 18:24 PST) (on file with author).
151 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
"' Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 549
F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
1" Although the Supreme Court enjoined operation of the dam to save the snail darter,
Tellico opened in 1980 pursuant to a congressional rider. CZECH & KRAUSMAN, supra note
97, at 102.
15 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 158.
155 Id. at 157. See Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-689, 80 Stat. 1002, 1014.
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endeavored to construct the Tellico Dam shortly thereafter despite grow-
ing opposition and a "tangle of lawsuits" retarding its progress." 6 As the
legend goes, just months prior to dissolution of an injunction preventing
the dam's completion 5 an ichthyologist exploring the project area
1581hdiscovered the previously unknown fish species, setting the stage for the
listing and challenge under the soon-to-be-enacted Endangered Species
Act of 1973.
In 1975, the Secretary of the Interior formally listed the snail
darter as an endangered species, 59 which triggered the protections of
ESA generally. Next, the Secretary determined the area to be inundated
by the dam to be snail darter critical habitat,60 thereby bringing to bear
the provisions of section 7 in particular. 6 ' Not long thereafter, an array
of concerned environmental groups and individuals ("Plaintiffs")'62 filed
suit to enjoin TVA's completion of the dam based on violations of the
ESA 63 vis-a-vis the little fish. Plaintiffs specifically alleged, among other
things, that TVA had violated section 7 of the ESA.1
6 1
B. The District Court Ruling: Imaginative Reconstruction
The trial court denied the Plaintiffs' request for an injunction to
prevent completion of Tellico Dam and dismissed the lawsuit. 65 Despite
156 437 U.S. at 158.
157 Prior to the Endangered Species Act lawsuit, opponents had successfully argued for an
injunction based on TVA's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS")
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et. seq.
("NEPA"). Envtl. Def. Fund v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972),
af/d, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). When TVA later completed its environmental review
to the satisfaction of the court, the injunction terminated. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), af'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974).
158 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 158.
159 40 Fed. Reg. 47,505, 47,506 (Oct. 9, 1975).
'8 41 Fed. Reg. 13,926, 13,927 (Apr. 1, 1976).61 d. The Secretary, relying on the language of section 7, instructed all federal agencies
to "take such action as is necessary to insure that [their] actions ... do not result in the
destruction or modification of" the snail darter's critical habitat. Id. at 13,928.
16' The plaintiff group included the Association of Southeastern Biologists, the Audubon
Council of Tennessee, Inc., Hiram G. Hill, Jr., Zygmunt J.B. Plater and Donald Cohen.
Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 419 F. Supp. 753, 754 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
163 Id.
" Id. Plaintiffs also argued that TVA had violated section 9 of the ESA, however, the court
chose not to decide the question. Id. at 755 n. 1.
165 Id. at 764.
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finding that operation of the dam would jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of the snail darter and modify its critical habitat 166 (seemingly
contravening the mandatory language of section 7), the court ruled that the
ESA neither compelled issuance of an injunction nor could it be construed
to prevent completion of the dam.167
In reaching its holding, the trial court relied on intentionalism as
its primary approach to statutory interpretation, an approach subsequently
adopted by two of the Supreme Court's three dissenters. The trial court
framed the issue as follows: under the circumstances presented, "is it
reasonable to conclude that Congress intended the Act to halt the Tellico
Project at its present stage of completion?"168
Given the stealth nature of section 7 (as originally enacted) and
given that the ESA nowhere refers to the Tellico Dam project, there was
no specific congressional intent for the court to rely on. So, in order to
answer the question of intent, the court needed to, and did, engage in a
certain amount of imaginative reconstruction. In its imaginative re-
construction exercise, the trial court primarily relied on two avenues of
support: subsequent legislative appropriations and a canon of reasonable
construction.
With respect to appropriations, the trial court viewed continued
congressional funding of the Tellico Project--occurring after enactment
of the ESA and after listing of the snail darter-as evidence of congres-
sional intent not to halt the project.'69 Despite acknowledging the general
'
6 6 Id. at 757. Regarding jeopardy of extinction, the court found as follows:
Wle conclude that it is highly probable that closure of the Tellico Dam and
the consequent impoundment of the river behind it will jeopardize the
continued existence of the snail darter. Almost all of the known population
of snail darters will be significantly reduced if not completely extirpated,
either due to the impoundment itself or the snail darter's potential loss of
reproductive ability if it is unable to adapt to a new environment.
Id. Regarding adverse modification of critical habitat, the court concluded that "the
preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that closure of the Tellico Dam in January
1977 and the consequent creation of the Tellico Reservoir will result in the adverse modi-
fication, if not complete destruction, of the snail darter's critical habitat." Id.
167 Id. at 761-64.
168 Id. at 760 (emphasis added).
169 For example, the trial court stated, "When the snail darter was listed on the endangered
species list in November 1975, TVA was fairly close to completion of the project which has
been consistently funded by Congress since 1966," and "[a]fter being so advised through
its committees [of the snail darter situation], Congress appropriated over $29 million for
the project though September 1976." Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
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rule disfavoring repeal by later congressional appropriations, the court
found the continued appropriations convincing as to congressional intent:
Nevertheless we believe that additional funding of the
Tellico Project and a House Committee's direction to com-
plete the project "in the public interest" after being informed
by TVA that it did not construe the Endangered Species
Act as preventing the project's completion is persuasive
that such an interpretation of the Act is consistent with
congressional intent.170
Following this same line of reasoning, Supreme Court Justices Powell and
Blackmun ran with the later appropriations approach in their dissent. 7 '
The trial court also relied heavily on a canon of reasonableness
in determining legislative intent. Essentially, the court viewed stopping
a project so long in the making, so costly to the public (including irretriev-
able losses of around $53 million),'72 and so close to completion, a pre-
posterous and, therefore, unreasonable outcome. Along these lines, the
trial judge stated:
The Act should be construed in a reasonable manner to
effectuate the legislative purpose.
At some point in time a federal project becomes so
near completion and so incapable of modification that a court
of equity should not apply a statute enacted long after
inception of the project to produce an unreasonable result.17 3
In essence, the court ruled it would be absurd for Congress to have
intended the ESA to operate so as to halt so significant and costly a proj-
ect 174 to prevent the extinction of a single species, and so it did not so
170 Id. at 761-62 (emphasis added).
171 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 200-01 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting,
Blackmun, J., joining).
172 TVA v. Hill, 419 F. Supp. at 759-60 (majority opinion).
173 Id. at 760 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Similarly, the court notes that "[a] far
different situation would be presented if the project were capable of reasonable modifi-
cations that would insure compliance with the Act or if the project had not been underway
for nearly a decade." Id. at 763.
174 Id. at 760. According to the trial court, "[tihe nature of the project is such that there are
no alternatives to impoundment of the reservoir, short of scrapping the entire project....
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intend.' In their dissent, Supreme Court Justices Powell and Blackmun
again found this interpretive approach persuasive: "Nor can [we]
believe that Congress could have intended this Act to produce the
'absurd result'- in the words of the District Court-of this case."'76
The decision is also illustrative in view of the statutory interpre-
tation roads not taken. The trial court neither seriously considered the
plain language of section 7 (thereby rejecting a textualists approach) 177
nor did it rely on legislative history of the enacting Congress (passing up
the ordinary evidentiary proof method of intentionalists). Moreover, al-
though the court raised the issue of administrative agency deference, it
declined to defer to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the administering
agency with expertise concerning endangered species.78
The trial court's approach may be criticized on various grounds.
First, there are process concerns. The trial court's legislative intent reason-
ing essentially boils down to an argument of implied repeal by subsequent
appropriations. The courts typically disfavor such claims 79 because appro-
priations approvals do not clearly or necessarily reflect any actual intent
by Congress to amend or repeal prior legislation. For these very reasons,
the Supreme Court rejects the trial court's position on appeal:
There is nothing in the appropriations measures, as passed,
which states that the Tellico Project was to be completed
Requiring TVA to consult with other agencies about alternatives not reasonably available
to it would be to require TVA to perform a useless gesture." Id. at 758.
17' The court's ruling also relied on agency deference to some extent.
"' TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 196 (Powell J., dissenting, Blackmun, J., joining). The Powell
dissent in good measure embraced both the rationale and conclusion of the trial court. The
dissenters applied the same canon of statutory interpretation calling for rejection of"absurd
results" as the trial judge to parse the plain meaning. Id. at 204-5. As for the ultimate
conclusion, Justice Powell's dissent states, "[Ilt seems clear that District Judge Taylor
correctly interpreted § 7 as inapplicable to the Tellico Project." Id. at 199 n.5.
... The trial court did set forth the relevant language of section 7, but only to present the
Plaintiffs argument before dismissing it. Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. at 754-55.
171 See id. at 761. The court explicitly declined to give deference to Fish and Wildlife guide-
lines concerning section 7 responsibilities, but it also implicitly declined to give deference
in refusing to enforce the Service's listing and critical habitat determinations establishing
the violation of section 7.
171 The appellate court makes this point explicitly: "'(I)t is well settled that repeal by impli-
cation is disfavored, and the doctrine applies with full vigor when, as here, the subsequent
legislation is an appropriations measure, and when the prior Act is to continue in its
general applicability ... .'" Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064, 1072 (6th Cir.
1977) (quoting Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 785
(1971)) (emphasis added).
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irrespective of the requirements of the Endangered Species
Act. These appropriations, in fact, represented relatively
minor components of the lump-sum amounts for the entire
TVA budget. To find a repeal of the Endangered Species
Act under these circumstances would surely do violence to
the 'cardinal rule ... that repeals by implication are not
favored.'... In practical terms, this 'cardinal rule' means
that '(i)n the absence of some affirmative showing of an
intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a
repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes
are irreconcilable. 8 s
In such situations, the constitutional safeguards of Article I may be tech-
nically fulfilled, but only ambiguously or dubiously satisfied.
A related concern turns on which legislature's intent counts. In
Hill v. TVA, the trial court's approach to statutory interpretation failed to
examine the actions and legislative history of the enacting Congress, and
instead focused on the legislative intent of a post-enactment Congress.'18
For intentionalists, it is the enacting Congress's intent that matters for
purposes of statutory interpretation. The reason has to do with the essen-
tial rationales for using legislative intent: that of maintaining separation
of powers and democratic government. Aside from the obvious process con-
cerns, consideration of post-enactment congressional intent gives judges
even greater freedom to make policy unbound by legislative process in the
name of statutory interpretation (or puts the judiciary in the untenable
position of mind-reading one or more subsequent congresses). It can be
argued that the trial court in Hill v. TVA attempted to do just that. If left
standing, the ruling would have transformed a strictly-written statutory
prohibition againstjeopardy into a permissive cost-benefit (or balancing)
' TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 189 (citations omitted). Regarding legislative intent to repeal,
the Court specifically noted:
The Appropriations Acts did not themselves identify the projects for
which the sums had been appropriated; identification of these projects
requires reference to the legislative history. Thus, unless a Member
scrutinized in detail the Committee proceedings concerning the appro-
priations, he would have no knowledge of the possible conflict between
the continued funding and the Endangered Species Act.
Id. at 189 n.35 (citation omitted).
181 The provision of the Endangered Species Act relied on by the Plaintiffs took effect in
December 1973, whereas the legislative history cited by the trial court as indicative of
legislative intent dates to 1975 and 1976. See Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. at 758-60.
[Vol. 32:427458
A LEAST BAD APPROACH
regulation. In so doing, the trial court arguably substituted its judgment
of what the law should be for the judgment of the democratically-elected
representatives who put into effect the Endangered Species Act of 1973.
The trial court exacerbated the separation of powers problem with
its "absurd consequences" approach to statutory interpretation. 8 2 This
interpretive approach seizes from Congress its power to make unreason-
able and purportedly unreasonable laws (despite Congress's authority to
do so), while it offers Congress political cover for shirking unpopular policy
decisions (contrary to Congress's responsibility for doing so). Although
a reasonableness interpretation of statutory meaning may be justified in
cases where a universal meaning or common understanding exists, it is
less so where rational minds may differ. As the trial court readily admit-
ted, Hill represented the latter situation: opinion could, and likely would,
differ.'83 Where differences of opinion within the court itself are probable
and even expected, the court's rationale is weakest because it is essen-
tially a policy substitution rather than an oversight correction.
These criticisms aside, the trial court's holding-based on a legis-
lative intent analysis-logically comports with the provision's stealth
character. Congress can have no specific intent with respect to a stealth
provision because, by definition, Congress was unaware of the provision's
existence and/or potential application. Moreover, the very fact that the
drafters covertly included the statutory language implies that congres-
sional support for explicit/outright inclusion was lacking (or thought to
be lacking). Thus, the trial court's refusal to interpret section 7 as prohib-
iting a dam operation was logically consistent with its reliance on legis-
lative intent: legislative intent did not support Plaintiffs claim because
there was no legislative intent on the part of the enacting Congress.
Nevertheless, even if there is logical consistency between the ulti-
mate holding and the stealth nature of the provision, the court never ex-
plicitly addresses this point. Rather than noting a lack of congressional
intent on the part of the enacting congress, the court simply argues its
point based on later congressional action. As a consequence, the court must
engage in the equivalent of a "full court press" exercise of imagination to
counter the plain language of the statute.
182 The appellate court criticized Judge Taylor's decision on this very issue. See Hill v.
TVA, 549 F.2d at 1069.
18 The trial court explained its thorough recitation of facts as follows: "Since this case
involves novel questions of law, about which there may be differences of opinion, fairly
detailed factual finding have been made...." Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. at 755 n.2.
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C. The Appellate Court Ruling: Deference, Purposivism & Plain
Language
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. According to
the appeals court, TVA had violated section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act, no grounds existed for an exemption, and the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing an injunction.1 4 In reaching its holding, the circuit
court relied on a combination of agency deference, purposivism, and plain
language to interpret section 7's stealth provision.
Regarding the issue of whether TVA had violated the ESA, the
appellate court deferred to the Secretary of Interior's regulatory definition
by finding the administrative interpretation both reasonable and worthy
of judicial ratification.'85 Justifying its deference, the court noted that
"[a]lthough we are not compelled to follow agency constructions of a
regulatory measure, courts have traditionally shown 'great deference to
the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged
with its administration'... particularly as to technical matters committed
by statute to [agency] expertise." 86 Additionally, the appellate court relied
on the agency's interpretation because it found deference advantageous
for promoting expeditious resolutions through consistent application of
the law with minimal intrusion to the judicial branch.17
The appellate court next relied on a combination of purposivism
and plain language to reject TVA's request for an exemption based on
grounds of expediency and economic exigencies:
To countenance so restrictive a construction ... in the
absence of positive reinforcement from the Act's legislative
history, would, in our view, be inimical to achieving its
objectives. We choose instead to give the term "actions" its
plain meaning in the belief that this will best effectuate
the will of Congress.'
Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d at 1064.
185 Id. at 1070.
" Id. (citations omitted). Of note, the case was decided seven years prior to the infamous
Chevron decision in which the Supreme Court validated and confirmed its commitment
to agency deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
117 Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d at 1070.
"M Id. at 1070-71 (emphasis added).
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The court explicitly referenced the statutory congressional declaration
of purposes to fortify its holding by stating, "Nor will we expurgate an
important federal policy statute designed to foreclose all activities anti-
thetic to the preservation of the 'esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people' of vulner-
able species offish, wildlife and plants."'89 This court used the combination
of purposivism and plain language to achieve its highest priority, that
of safeguarding separation of powers among the judicial, executive and
legislative branches of government. 9 °
The appellate court's interpretive approach offers a key advantage
over that of the trial court decision. It limits congressional duck-and-
cover maneuvers. Scholars such as Professor David Schoenbrod have
persuasively argued that Congress strategically adopts sweeping language
on statutory aims to generate broad constituent support, while leaving
implementing provisions vague and nebulous to foist off hard and/or
controversial decisions to the administrative agencies and courts. 191 In
this way, legislators take credit for acting, but shirk their constitutional
responsibilities to legislate in the public interest. In refusing tojudicially
exempt the TVA project, the court would stick the hot potato back in the
lap of Congress to legislatively amend unequivocal language of section 7.192
In addition, Congress would have to take a stand on the policy conflict
between the Act's popular species conservation mandate and a favored
economic development project. In other words, Congress would have to
clean up its own mess.
189 Id. at 1073 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3)). The court references the purpose and
spirit of the Act in several other passages of the decision. Id. at 1072 ("The meaning and
spirit of the Act are clear on its face.").
190 "Our abiding interest in preserving the functional independence of the coordinate
branches of government, as ordained by the constitutional separation of their enumerated
powers, compels us to reverse the District Court and grant the reliefrequested."Id at 1069.
And, in conclusion, "[tihe separation of powers doctrine is too fundamental a thread in our
constitutional fabric for us to be tempted to preempt congressional action in the name of
equity or expediency." Id. at 1074.
9  See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON:
HOW CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES THE
PEOPLE (2005).
192 The court's "responsibility under § 1540(g)(1)(A) is merely to preserve the status quo
where endangered species are threatened, thereby guaranteeing the legislative or execu-
tive branches sufficient opportunity to grapple with the alternatives." Hill v. TVA, 549
F.2d at 1071.
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Nevertheless, the appellate court's holding may be criticized for
blatantly ignoring the stealth nature of the provision at issue. There is
no mention of the possibility of congressional oversight or ignorance of the
potency of the language adopted, despite an obvious disconnect between
the title of the provision and its content. There is no hint that Congress
might have overlooked compulsory wording tucked within rambling and
overly wordy sentence structure. To the contrary, the appellate court
decision makes no effort to reconcile the stealth nature of the provision
with its effort to "effectuate the will of the Congress." 93
D. The Supreme Court Ruling: Plain Language and Statutory
Purpose
The Supreme Court took a somewhat different tack. The Court
opted for a textual approach grounded by statutory purpose. The Court's
keen reliance on textualism can be summed up best by the Chief Justice's
own words:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision
whose terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the
Endangered Species Act. Its very words affirmatively com-
mand all federal agencies 'to insure that actions authorized,
funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the con-
tinued existence' of an endangered species or 'result in the
destruction or modification of habitat of such species .... '
This language admits of no exception.' 94
Thus, in answer to the question whether TVA would be in violation of
the ESA if it completed and operated the dam, the Court concluded that
"the explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act require" an
answer in the affirmative.'95 To rule otherwise and sustain petitioner's
position, the Court "would be forced to ignore the ordinary meaning of plain
language." 196
1931d.
194 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)) (emphasis in original).
'
95 Id. at 172-73 (emphasis added).
196 Id. at 173.
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Additionally, the Court gave weight to the general purposes of the
Act. 9 v The Court considered the ESA's expressly enumerated purposes:
As it was finally passed, the Endangered Species Act of
1973 represented the most comprehensive legislation for the
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any
nation. Its stated purposes were 'to provide a means where-
by the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved,' and 'to pro-
vide a program for the conservation of such... species....'
In furtherance of these goals, Congress expressly stated...
that 'all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to
conserve endangered species and threatened species ....
And, it is against these purposes which the Court would measure TVA's
claim: "The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt
and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This
is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every
section of the statute." 99
Why a textual/purposivism approach? It was because the majority
cared first and foremost about preservation of separation of powers and
judicial integrity. The Court explained: "[In our constitutional system
the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to
pre-empt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with
'common sense and the public weal.' Our Constitution vests such responsi-
bilities in the political branches." 00 Thus, the majority chides the dissent:
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a
particular course consciously selected by the Congress is
to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once
the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its consti-
tutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an
197 The Court considered the language, structure, legislative evolution of the statute to
assess purpose. Id. at 173-195. However, the Court made clear that, but for countering
the dissent's assertions, when confronted with an unambiguous statute legislative history
ordinarily would not be "a guide to its meaning." Id. at 184 n. 29.
... Id. at 180 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).199 Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
200 Id. at 195.
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end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we
vested with the power of veto.2"1
And, in a footnote responding to the dissent's position that the meaning
of section 7 was "far from 'plain,"' the majority mocks the dissent's approach
as unprincipled:
Aside from this bare assertion, however, no explanation is
given to support the proffered interpretation. This recalls
Lewis Carroll's class advice on the construction of language:
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in
rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to
mean-neither more nor less.'
Aside from being unexplicated, the dissent's reading
of § 7 is flawed on several counts.20 2
The majority, perhaps a bit defensively, portrays the case as a slam dunk
for the snail darter.
Interestingly, but unpersuasively, the majority goes out of its way
to suggest conscious and deliberate drafting by Congress.2 3 Yet nothing
in Congress's response (continued funding of the dam project20 4 and
subsequent congressional statements) indicates this to be true; to the
contrary, the subsequent brouhaha and ultimate amendment of section
7 forcefully contradict it. Not surprisingly, Justice Powell's dissent comes
to the opposite conclusion on this very point: "This unfortunate
litigation . . .may have been invited by careless draftsmanship of
201 Id. at 194-95.
202 Id. at 173 n.18.
203The Court not only referred to a "particular course consciously selected by the Congress"
but purposeful drafting of section 7. Id. at 194. Specifically, the Court noted that "the House
manager of the bill, Representative Dingell, provided an interpretation of what the
Conference bill would require, making it clear that the mandatory provisions of § 7 were
not casually or inadvertently included... [.1" Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
204 Congress continued appropriations for the Tellico project in 1976 and 1977 after the
Secretary of Interior's listing of the snail darter as endangered in November 10, 1975,
notification of the species' plight, and the initiation of litigation. Hill v. TVA, 437 U.S.
at 197-200 (Powell, J., dissenting, Blackmun, J., joining). As the dissenters noted, the
Senate Committee on Appropriations repeatedly indicated that it did not view the ESA
as prohibiting project completion. Id. at 200-02 (Powell, J., dissenting, Blackmun, J.,
joining); S. Rep. No. 94-960, at 104 (1977).
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otherwise meritorious legislation."" 5 The dissent further tore down the
majority's position by pointing out the following:
While the Court's review of the legislative history estab-
lishes that Congress intended to require governmental
agencies to take endangered species into account ....
there is not even a hint in the legislative history that
Congress intended to compel the undoing or abandonment
of any project or program later found to threaten a newly
discovered species.06
But perhaps more telling are certain internal deliberations and statements
of the Chief Justice. It has been suggested that Chief Justice Burger took
on the drafting of the opinion (and voted for reversal) to scold Congress
for irresponsibly accepting stealth language and to convey displeasure
at such serious legislative inattention.0 7 Apparently, the real
message conveyed was to Congress. And the message was: Say what you
mean 20 and mean what you say."'
205 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 203 n.11 (Powell, J., dissenting, Blackmun, J., joining)
(emphasis added).2 Id. at 207-08 (emphasis added). In the long and raucous aftermath of the Tellico Dam
controversy, Congress amended the ESA so as to, among other things, tame some of the
section 7 requirements. Shannon Peterson, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A
Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463,485 (1999). Thus, the
dissenters correctly predicted the congressional response: immediate amendment of the
Act. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 210.
21' See Holly Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow Escape for a Brand New Law,
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 109,131 (Oliver A Houck & Richard J Lazarus eds., 2005)
("Burger may have been trying to goad Congress into action. His memo assigning himself
the case had noted that he planned to 'serve notice' on Congress that it should take care of
its own 'chestnuts.' He went out of his way to point out in a footnote exactly how trivial this
species was"); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental
Law Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805,826 n.71 (1986) ("Chief
Justice Burger, who assigned himself the opinion and made many caustic references to
the snail darter," also gave an oral delivery "marked by a tone of sarcasm, inviting
Congress to amend the Act quickly."). Along these same lines, in a compilation of Chief
Justice Burger's speeches, the introduction to section three states that "His opinion made
the odd-and expensive-result of this unwise law so clear that it was virtually a challenge
to Congress to'clean up its own act.'" WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OFJUSTICE 217 (1990).
208 Something along the lines of the Dispatch lyrics which go:
Say what you want,
Say what you mean,
Question yourself,
Are you really what you seem?
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IV. A LEAST BAD APPROACH
The prior sections bring us inexorably to the what-does-this-all-
mean part of the Article. What should courts do when faced with a
statutory challenge of an ESA provision which evidences stealth
characteristics? Building on the earlier discussions, this section suggests
a least bad approach for such statutory challenges.
As noted in the general discussion of statutory interpretation
approaches in Part I, there is no perfect approach; all are indeterminate
to some degree and each has certain other weaknesses vis-a-vis the demo-
cratic process, and pragmatic criteria against which they are typically
judged.21 ° Further, the dramatic array of interpretations of section 7's
consultation requirement described in Part III reflect the confounding
nature of stealth provisions and the apparent theoretical disarray absent
a common or preferred approach for attacking this interpretive conundrum.
Recognizing these inherent limits and situational realities, this Part offers
a least bad approach for interpretation of stealth ESA provisions.
The proposed least bad approach for interpreting ESA stealth
provision relies on plain language interpretation grounded in purposivism
and informed by contemporary contextual considerations. The touchstone
for interpreting ESA stealth provisions, as with all statutory provisions,
must remain the plain language of the law. But, unlike "the cheese," the
plain language cannot "stand alone."" This is a soft, not new, textualism
Say who you are,
Say what you mean,
Question yourself,
Are you really what you dream?
DISPATCH, HEY... HEY... (Bomber Records 1996).
209 It is a message that the Court itself could have been more mindful of, for the decision
smacks a bit of intellectual dishonesty. Despite the arguments to the contrary, the major-
ity's true rebuke suggests understanding that Congress never consciously intended such
an outcome. The majority may have been better offby openly tackling the stealth nature
of the provision and then placing responsibility for correction squarely on legislative
shoulders, rather than crediting Congress with deliberative action and then rebuking it
for not saying what it meant. If the Court wants Congress to say what it means, it should
do so too.
210 The governmental, process, and pragmatic criteria derive from the concerns and criti-
cisms of the existing approaches set forth in Part I. See discussion supra Part I.
211 "The cheese stands alone" refers to the final verse in the classic nursery rhyme "The
Farmer in the Dell," in which the farmer takes a wife who takes a child and on and on
before finally reaching out for and taking the last alone item, the cheese. Interestingly,
even the cheese joins the rest of the farm group and only then stands alone to restart the
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approach. It calls for contextual reinforcement based on the reason for and
the spirit of the ESA. Additionally, in a nod to pragmatism, the least bad
approach acknowledges temporal socio-cultural-political changes and
advances in scientific knowledge and methodology.
A. The Starting Point: Plain Language
The plain language constitutes the traditional starting point for
statutory interpretation chiefly because it confers important safeguards
for judicial interpretation. First, by centering attention on the actual text
(what the legislature said), plain language interpretation encourages
transparency. Transparency, in turn, holds both legislators and judges
accountable to the public (for what they say and what they say was said,
respectively). Second, consistent with constitutional design, tying meaning
to the actual words of a statute constrains would-be judicial policymakers
from straying too far afield from the role of the judiciary and too far into
the role the legislature.212
Moreover, the plain language constitutes the logical starting point
for stealth provision interpretation because there is no legislative intent
with respect to the specific provision at issue. Stealth provisions, by defi-
nition and design, are provisions of which few, if any, legislators took
serious note. They are stealthy in large part because most legislators
failed to consider, ponder, deliberate, or debate their significance at the
time of enactment. Moreover, the drafters'213 need for concealment of (or
perceived need to conceal) their intended meaning regarding a provision's
legal significance suggests that had the drafters' true intentions been
known to Congress as a whole the provision would have, at the very least,
generated sufficient controversy to make passage questionable. Why else
cloak their significance? It makes little sense, in fact it would be
oxymoronic, to have the courts rely on legislative intent absent any such
game. THE FARMER IN THE DELL, available at http://kids.niehs.nih.gov/lyrics/farmer.htm.
212 See William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and
Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799,812 (1984-1985) (arguing that courts adopting a plain
meaning approach "emphasized their duty to follow the will of the legislature under the
principle of separation of powers").
"' Note that "drafter" here refers to legislative staff and/or persons other than specific
legislators who contributed to and influenced the precise wording of particular stat-
utory provisions.
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intent or to pretend otherwise by means of judicially-manufactured
legislative intent.214
It could be countered that a lack of legislative intent is itself sig-
nificant for interpretive purposes. Lack of intent could arguably justify
a particularly narrow interpretation that would imbue a stealth provision
with little or no significant legal or regulatory meaning. Such an approach
comports with those who view legislative intent as the touchstone of inter-
pretation and would serve as a deterrent to those inclined to draft stealth
provisions. The trouble with this approach is threefold. First, it lets
Congress off the hook for its own inattentiveness to legislative detail.
Second, in cases where a narrow interpretation runs counter to an appar-
ent plain meaning, it undermines fundamental process values associated
with formal constitutional procedures for legislative enactment. Third,
lack of specific intent does not necessarily correlate with a narrow inter-
pretation. Had Congress focused its attention on the matter in question,
it may have chosen some moderate or intermediate meaning rather than
an extremely narrow one (even if was unlikely to adopt the measure
exactly as the drafters intended).
B. The Necessary Context: Purposivism
The plain language constitutes the starting point, but not the end
point, of stealth language interpretation. Language derives meaning, at
least in part, from context.215 For ESA stealth provisions, purposivism
best performs this service. Specifically, purposivism confers important
safeguards for judicial interpretation by taking a holistic perspective in
contrast to focusing solely on the letter of the law, which can leave inter-
preters in a contextual vacuum.216 Grounding the plain language approach
in the fundamental purposes, goals, and objectives of the Act, moreover,
constrains would-be judicial policymakers from straying too far from the
will of Congress and offers legitimacy for judicial interpretations.217
214 For the court to rely on legislative intent to justify the meaning of stealth language
would require both pure speculation and whole-cloth invention. The very notion makes
little sense other to maintain some false sense of legislative attentiveness to
legislative detail.
215 See discussion supra Part I.B.
... See Blatt, supra note 212, at 834 ("Statutory purpose is sufficiently all-embracing to
permit examination of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case. This in turn,
improves judicial decisionmaking.").217 See id. at 808-09 ("Like other early classical doctrines, legislative intent offered a middle
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Although some might argue that purposivism itself opens the door
to judicial activism, this view ignores the reality that plain language-
along with its associated canons-can be equally subjective and
malleable to desired policy outcomes, only less transparently so.21
Grounding provides interpretive checks and balances because neither
approach alone avoids indeterminate results, but together they
circumscribe the interpretive universe within appropriate bounds.
With respect to the ESA in particular, Congress set forth certain
overarching purposes, including:
to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may
be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of
such endangered species and threatened species, and to
take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the pur-
poses of the treaties and conventions set forth [therein].219
Congress further "declared [it] to be the policy of Congress that all Federal
departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and
threatened species and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of
the purposes of this chapter."220 In its findings, Congress also declared
that "the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the
international community to conserve to the extent practicable the various
species of fish or wildlife and plants facing extinction" with respect to
certain then-existing treaties and conventions.22' These congressional
statements reveal an unusually unequivocal and singularly focused com-
mitment to domestic species and ecosystem conservation with only a
moderately less fervent international commitment.
This rather self-evident and focused purpose has not escaped
judicial notice. Over the last three-plus decades the federal courts have
often recognized and reiterated this unifying statutory destination.222 As
ground between judicial activism and complete deference to the will of others, between
unabashed paternalism and unconditional nonintervention.").
21' Textualism and the canons of construction in conveying an objective air, mask their
inherent subjectivity, making them arguably more deceptive/disingenuous than pur-
posivism. Meaning freed from context and opposing canons for every view leave judges
to pick and choose among meanings they prefer. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
219 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
220 Id. § 153 1(c).
221 Id. § 1531(a)(4).
222 See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 161 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The Endangered Species
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a consequence, the grounding of plain language in purposivism translates
to a finger on the scale for threatened and endangered species.223 That
is, the fundamental contextual consideration for ESA stealth provision
interpretation must be conserving species and the ecosystems upon which
they depend. For the ESA at least, the congressionally-determined pur-
poses and policies of the Act set the outer contours for judicial interpreters;
the lines of the drawing that all the coloring should fall within. Regardless
of the level of congressional inattention paid any particular implementing
stealth provision, all can and should be evaluated in the context of these
end goals of the Act and all can and should be interpreted as a means
towards conserving endangered species and threatened species and the
ecosystems upon which they depend, unless and until Congress explicitly
states otherwise.224
Secondary benefits of this approach include an incentive for care-
ful congressional scrutiny of future amendments and a disincentive for
future stealth drafting of the worst type of stealth provisions-those
contrary to the Act's fundamental purposes.
C. A Nod to Pragmatic Considerations: Adaptive Statutory
Interpretation
In applying the proposed least bad approach, the interpreters of
ESA stealth provisions would additionally consider scientific, technological,
and societal changes since the ESA's enactment. An evolutive perspective,
however, would be secondary in importance to the textual and purposi-
vism interpretive elements. This least bad approach element might be
Act was enacted with the purpose of conserving endangered and threatened species and
the ecosystems on which they depend. The ESA is 'the most comprehensive legislation
for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.'") (quoting Tenn
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)) (other citations omitted).
22 Federal courts have taken a similar approach in determining the availability of injunc-
tive relief in ESA cases. See, e.g., Strahan, 127 F.3d at 160 ("Under the ESA ... the
balancing and public interest prongs have been answered by Congress' determination
that the 'balance of hardships and the public interest tips heavily in favor of protected
species.'" (quoting Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington Northern R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1510
(9th Cir. 1994 )) (emphasis added).
224 This approach may also discourage congressional duck-and-cover maneuvers. First,
if consistently adopted, the approach provides Congress advance warning as to how courts
will likely rule in the case of stealth drafting. Second, it constrains Congress from promising
the world in statutory pronouncements, unless that is what it truly intends. Third, it
discourages the leave-it-to-the-courts-to-work-out approach to statutory drafting.
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called adaptive statutory interpretation 225 (or, perhaps, dynamic statutory
interpretation lite226). A court applying such an adaptive interpretative
approach would take account of interpretations of the stealth provision
that best comport with current scientific understanding regarding biodiver-
sity and proven strategies for conservation of species and the ecosystems
upon which they depend. However, adaptive statutory interpretation
would not attempt to gauge or account for shifts in political or public
values, nor would it be controlling. Thus, the ordering of priorities for the
interpreter would first and foremost be text and purpose and only second-
arily adaptive considerations for purposes of minor statutory updating
and fine-tuning adjustments.
1. An Adaptive Approach for Stealth Provisions
An adaptive approach to ESA stealth provision interpretation
makes sense for a number of reasons. First, an adaptive approach can
avoid unnecessary statutory obsolescence. According to advocates of evolu-
tive approaches, an adaptive interpretive approach makes most sense for
old, generally worded statutes that lack congressional deliberation and for
which "the societal or legal context of the statute has changed materi-
ally."227 The ESA, with more than thirty years under its belt, certainly
meets the "old" criterion. Also, stealth provisions by their very nature
225 The notion of "adaptive statutory interpretation" derives from the ecological concept
of "adaptive management." As defined by biologist Simon Levin, adaptive management
refers to "maintaining flexibility in management structures and adjusting rules and re-
gimes on the basis of monitoring and other sources of new data." SIMON A. LEVIN, FRAGILE
DOMINION: COMPLEXITYAND THE COMMONS 200 (1999). See also KA N. LEE, COMPASS AND
GYROsCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 53 (1993) (defining
adaptive management as the application of "the concept of experimentation to the design
and implementation of natural-resource and environmental policies"); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking
of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment
by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUs. L. REV. 933, 996 (1997) ("The point
[of adaptive management] is to move decision making out of the laboratory modeling
approach and into the field, and to open the process up to continuous change based on a
continuous input of information and analysis."). Similar to dynamic statutory interpre-
tation, the concept of adaptive management encourages flexible management policies that
incorporate new information as it becomes available.
226 For a comprehensive discussion of of dynamic statutory interpretation, I refer readers
to the numerous writings of Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 12.
227 Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 1987, supra note 74, at 1484. See also
discussion supra Part I.C.
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lack legislative deliberation, meeting yet a second criterion for dynamic
interpretation. Moreover, since the ESA's enactment, scientific thinking
has shifted rather dramatically. The classic ecology paradigm of the
"Balance of Nature," with its ideal natural state has been challenged by
"Nonequilibrium Ecology," a dynamic state theory of nature;228 conservation
strategies focused on individual species protections have moved toward
more holistic concepts of biodiversity protection and ecosystem-based
management;229 extinction rates have escalated rather than dissipated;
2 °
habitat modification has overtaken over-harvest as the primary culprit
of species decline; 23 1 and a scientific consensus has emerged that global
climate change exists with potentially perilous consequences for species
worldwide.232 Over the course of this same time period, academics describe
221 See Daniel Botkin, Adjusting Law to Nature's Discordant Harmonies, 7 DUKE ENVTL.
LAW & POL'Y F. 25-37 (1996).
229 See Robert B. McKinstry Jr. et al., Legal Tools that Provide Direct Protection for
Elements ofBiodiversity, 16 WmENERL.J. 909 (2007) (discussing evolution ofbiodiversity
regulation). See, e.g., Arlo H. Hemphill & George Shillinger, Casting the Net Broadly:
Ecosystem-Based Management Beyond National Jurisdiction, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. &
POLVY 56 (2006) (promoting shift to ecosystem-based management approach for fisheries
protection); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal
Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time For Something Completely Different? 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 555, 561 (1995) (recognizing a shift to biodiversity regulation on nonfederal
lands).230 See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 280 (1992) (reporting the rate of species
loss as 27,000 per year, conservatively). A substantial number of scientists now believe
that we are in the midst of a "mass extinction." Joby Warrick, Mass Extinction Underway,
Majority of Biologists Say, WASH. POST, April 21, 1998, at A4; see also Dana Clark & David
Downes, What Price Biodiversity? Economic Incentives and Biodiversity Conservation in
the United States, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 9, 9 (1996) ("We are currently experiencing an
extinction crisis analogous to the one in which the dinosaurs disappeared millions of years
ago. An important distinction, however, is that this time we are the cause of the
crisis.").
231 See BRIAN CZECH & PAUL R. KRAUSMAN, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: HISTORY,
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY 10-11 (2001) (explaining historical transition
from "blatant overharvest" to habitat alteration as primary cause of endangerment); see
also, George Cameron Coggins,A Premature Evaluation ofAmerican Endangered Species
Law, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 1, 3-4 (Donald C. Baur
& Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002) (explaining by way of example: "bald eagles were not just
being shot by disgruntled sheepherders, their entire milieu had been poisoned by DDT. The
recently listed salmon runs were not just being overfished, their riverine (and marine)
habitat was in wretched condition from multiple causes. Few want to shoot red-cockaded
woodpeckers for sport; their decline is attributable to the conversion of climax forest into
monoculture tree farms.")
232 For example, the New York Times recently reported that two-thirds of the world's polar
bear population will likely disappear by 2050 due to melting sea ice as a result of green-
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a series of societal viewpoint transformations coinciding with as many
as four different stages of environmental law development.233 Ideally, by
acknowledging scientific maturation and permitting some contextual
updating, judicial interpreters facilitate the ESA's continuing relevance
and effectiveness. Through interpretive fine-tuning, occasional course
adjustments, and periodic adaptive updating, courts can thwart unnec-
essary statutory obsolescence. 234 As a practical matter, because political
motivations,235 procedural and resource obstacles to lawmaking, and
political process biases tend to coalesce to create legislative ennui and
make statutory updating by Congress exceptionally rare, courts can 236
and should step up to fill this gap.237
Second, adaptive interpretation discounts anti-democratic, consti-
tutionally suspect stealth provisions. In giving greater weight to current
contextual considerations, interpreters necessarily reduce the significance
given to hidden plain language. Consequently, congressionally-unexamined
textual pronouncements would justly wield less authority. As an added
house gas accumulations. John M. Broder & Andrew C. Revkin, Warming May Wipe Out
Most Polar Bears, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007.
233 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 88 (5th ed. 2006) (stating that four of six stages in the history of U.S. environmental
law occurred between 1962 and 2006).234 Asserting these very policy positions, several thousand biologists petitioned Congress
as follows:
As Earth has changed and as science has progressed since the Endangered
Species Act was authorized in 1973, the ESA has served our nation well,
largely because of its flexibility and its solid foundation in science. It is
crucial to maintain these fundamental principles. The challenges ofeffec-
tive implementation of the Act should not be interpreted to require sub-
stantive rewriting of this valuable, well-functioning piece of legislation.
Letter from 5,738 Biologists to the United States Senate Concerning Science in the
Endangered Species Act (March 2006), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/
signon/letter-from-biologists.pdf.
235 Individual legislators, motivated by the desire to be reelected, will "want to do nothing
when there is no organized demand for legislation," which results in "too little policy
addressing common problems." Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 1987, supra
note 74, at 1519.
236 Institutionally, the courts have authority to share this role with Congress. See id. at
1500 ("[Tlhe fact remains that the structure of the Constitution, the apparent expectations
of the Framers, and two hundred years of Supreme Court practice establish the authority
of federal courts to make law, subject to legislative override.").
... Depending on the circumstances, administrative agencies may be as suited to this role
and so share an updating and statutory construction function with courts. See discussion
infra Part IV.D.
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benefit, discrediting of illegitimate stealth plain language may deter
future stealth drafters and thereby improve legitimacy of legislative
branch lawmaking.238
Lastly, adaptive interpretation of stealth provisions shores up
judicial branch institutional integrity and legitimacy. Stealth provisions
lack specific intent and so judicial reliance on historical, intent-based
interpretive rationales necessarily comes across not only as artificial, but
also as dishonest. For example, given the stealth nature of section 7, the
majority's strenuous assertions of conscious drafting in TVA v. Hill appear
not merely contrived, but intellectually dishonest.239 In contrast, adaptive
approaches can be pragmatic, contextually relevant, and transparent. The
gut appeal of the trial court's argument of the absurdity of shutting down
a multi-million dollar dam just days from completion bears this out.240
By substituting a dynamic approach for imaginative reconstruction, judicial
interpreters have an opportunity to reduce contempt for and enhance
legitimacy of judicial branch determinations.
2. Only a Nod to Adaptive Approaches
Nevertheless, under the proposed least bad approach adaptive
interpretation takes a back seat to more traditional approaches. This
holds true even where a material contextual schism exists between the
original purposes of the ESA and current policy norms and public values.
With all the sound reasons for adaptive interpretation of stealth provisions,
why only a nod to contextual considerations? One reason is that stealth
provisions are clearly worded directives carefully wordsmithed by drafters.
In unambiguous language situations, even strong advocates of dynamic
interpretation would likely require greater respect for statutory language
and lean towards a textual, rather than a dynamic interpretation.24 '
23 Just as congressional duck-and-cover maneuvers (which allow legislators to take credit
for action and avoid blame for policy failures) and pork barrel politics detract from con-
gressional legitimacy, so too does inattentive and careless law crafting.
... For similar reasons, the trial court's exercise in imaginative reconstruction also holds
little persuasive authority.
240 See discussion supra Part III.B.
241 In Professor Eskridge's model, stealth provisions seem to fit into the category of older
text specifically addressing the issue, where textual perspectives control interpretation.
See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 1987, supra note 74, at 1496. "In general,
the more detailed the text is, the greater weight the interpreter will give to textual
considerations." Id. at 1497.
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Limited support for adaptive interpretation of stealth provisions
also turns on respect for the bedrock constitutional principle of separation
of powers, esteem for the rule of law, and caution in the face of lingering
concerns regarding countermajoritarian risks242 associated with judicial
lawmaking power. In TVA v. Hill, the Supreme Court asserted this point
vigorously and persuasively.243
Finally, over-reliance on an adaptive interpretation approach for
stealth provisions might inadvertently exacerbate legislative branch dys-
function. The more public policy responsibility the courts take on, the less
responsible Congress need be." Problems of legislative duck-and-cover,
lackadaisical law crafting, and strategic dodging of needed legislative
reform, all would seem encouraged, rather than discouraged, by ramping
up the role of courts (and/or administrative agencies). In the face of legis-
lative branch shortcomings, and especially in the face of dramatic shifts
in public values and priorities, corrective measures should first attempt
to improve congressional responsiveness to citizen voters and shared
public concerns. Reform efforts should aim at promoting congressional
accountability (e.g., lobbying and election reforms, and public education
campaigns) rather than passing on responsibility to unelected judges.
The governmental responsibilities established by the Constitution
are neither black and white fixed boundaries, nor completely gray demar-
cations. And, in the face of these real but overlapping divides, adaptive
statutory interpretation should be used cautiously and conservatively.
Giving just a nod to adaptive considerations respects the primacy of legis-
lative lawmaking and yet allows for pragmatic statutory interpretation
that is not completely blind to contextual realities.
242 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (discussing counter-majoritarian difficulties with
judicial review).24See discussion supra Part III.D.
The argument here is that, left to their own devices, legislators motivated by personal
reelection interests and/or captured by special interests would prefer to pass generic
legislation and pass along the difficult policymaking responsibility to judges and admin-
istrative agencies. Moreover, with respect to environmental law, the system Congress
established is "political in a different and invidious sense: the legislators shaped it to
make themselves look good rather than to serve the interests of their constituents."
SCHOENBROD, supra note 191, at X.
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D. Some Things Stay the Same: Agency Deference
Under the proposed least bad approach, administrative agency
deference continues as an interpretive overlay applied in concert with
previously identified elements of stealth interpretation. This is primarily
because there are no good reasons to depart from Chevron's ingrained
and institutionalized approach to interpretation with respect to ESA
stealth provisions. 245 The rationales and justifications for administrative
deference tend to apply equally well (or poorly) to stealth provisions as to
other enactments.246
This is certainly a practical approach given the widespread acqui-
escence towards the precedent of the Chevron two-step. But is it a least
bad approach? The prickly part of this analysis arises as a consequence
of the very nature of stealth provisions. How can Congress have "directly
spoken" to a matter 247 if it gave it little or no consideration whatsoever?
And yet, how can a court deem a provision unclear where it is straight-
forward and certain on its face? Reconciliation demands closer attention
to guiding principles.
Integrating the least bad approach with the Chevron two-step
compels the following interpretive analysis. A court finding a stealth
provision unambiguous after application of the threshold interpretive
elements of the least bad approach (plain language, statutory purpose,
and adaptive interpretation) would not be required to defer to an agency
interpretation. 24 s However, if application of the threshold principles
245 See Nat'l Assn. of Home Builders v. Def. of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2007) ("We
have recognized that '[t]he latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute,
together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, establishes
that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation' of the
statutory scheme." (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Or.,
515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995))).
24 This is not to say that judicial deference as an interpretive device can be easily applied,
nor should it be taken to mean judicial deference might not benefit from a more textured
analytical refinement, but merely that stealth provisions can be treated the same as other
statutory interpretation situations. For a discussion of the pros and cons of a general rule
of judicial deference, see Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 15, at 445.
247 Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
248 This approach does not take any real leap beyond existing practice:
In making the threshold determination under Chevron, 'a reviewing
court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory pro-
vision in isolation.' Rather, '[t]he meaning--or ambiguity-of certain
words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context....
It is a 'fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of
a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in
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yields ambiguity, the court's approach would depend on the type of the
ambiguity at issue.
1. Harmless Error Stealth Situations
Where the plain meaning derived from statutory language easily
aligns with the statutory purposes of the ESA, judicial review stops at
Chevron Step One. In these situations, the court gives effect to the
meaning derived from application of the least bad approach. Despite the
lack of specific intent and a failure of deliberative lawmaking, the
unambiguous meaning of the stealth provision corresponds with
unambiguous general intentions deliberated and expressed by the
legislature. This approach departs from the traditional Chevron approach
only in delineating certain factors for the initial evaluation of meaning,
and does so only to tailor review to the peculiar nature of stealth
provisions.
I view these stealth provisions cases essentially as harmless
enactment errors (Harmless Error Stealth Situations) because the least
bad approach merely narrows interpretive outcomes within reasonably
acceptable bounds. The stealth drafters prevail, but only because their
strategically inserted language was clearly worded, passed muster under
the Constitution's formal procedural safeguards, and aligned with
expressed purposes of the Act.
Moreover, an additional check on interpretive errors and judicial
extremism exists by way of post-facto legislative corrective action. If the
current Congress deems the judicial interpretation at odds with some
the overall statutory scheme."
Nat'l Assn. of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2534.
Note that although the majority in National Association of Home Builders set the
rule out nicely, I believe the dissenters had the more muscular argument on its
application. The strongest reasons being: (1) nothing in the wording of section 7's stealth
provision carves out mandatory agency actions from other federal actions, which not only
pulls the rug out from under the majority's conclusion, but also against its analysis for
agency deference; (2) the conservation purposes of the ESA (and the environmental
purposes of CWA, for that matter) weigh heavily against the majority's either/or
approach to a perceived statutory conflict; and (3) because the responsibility for such a
potentially enormous substantive statutory change (an exemption for all nondiscretionary
and quasi-discretionary federal actions) belongs to Congress, not the agencies, and not
five justices. See id. at 2538-53(Stevens, J., dissenting).
For more of a generic discussion of Chevron in the regulatory arena, see A GUIDE
TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, ch. 3 (John F. Duffy & Michael
Herz eds., 2005).
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unexpressed original intent, current legislative priorities, or prevailing
public sentiment, it may amend. This is exactly the situation which came
about following the TVA v. Hill decision. Congress, immensely displeased
with the ruling, amended section 7 to its liking. As a practical matter,
given the time and resources at stake, a congressional response seems un-
likely unless the judicial interpretation departs radically from the current
political agenda. 249 Acknowledging that legislative action would be un-
likely, the primary justification for putting the question back to Congress
is to tip the scales in favor of plainly written stealth provisions in accord
with the originally expressed conservation and biodiversity aspirations
of the ESA. As an added benefit, the approach may encourage closer
future attention to legislative drafting generally.
2. Dangerous Stealth Situations
When dealing with ambiguities that result from contradictions or
tension between ESA stealth provisions and the ESA's enumerated pur-
poses, independent judicial review appears most advisable. I refer to these
cases as Dangerous Stealth Situations because inattentive lawmaking inad-
vertently produced measures contrary to expressed legislative priorities.
In these situations, an interpreting court would apply the least
bad interpretive principles to reconcile, to the greatest extent possible,
the stealth provision with the enumerated conservation and biodiversity
goals of the ESA. The suggested approach discourages judicial sanction
of unintentional legislative disconnects. Where statutory program ele-
ments resulting from stealth drafting contradict statutory ambitions
adopted by deliberative drafting, the deliberated provisions should re-
ceive substantially greater interpretive weight. Again, Congress retains
a post-facto check on radical or outdated judicial interpretations. However,
by putting the issue back to Congress to clarify or specify a contradictory
meaning, the court forces formal legislative deliberation on provisions
at odds with the general intent expressed by the enacting legislature.
In Dangerous Stealth Situations, the least bad approach strays
somewhat from the traditional Chevron approach. Several justifications
support this departure. First, the strongest cases for deference to admin-
249 See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 1987, supra note 74, at 1525 (noting
that "legislative inertia means that only occasionally and adventitiously will Congress
respond to judicial statutory interpretations at odds with original intent or purpose" and
offering several examples).
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istrative interpretations arise where Congress explicitly left statutory gaps
to be filled by agency experts.25 ° Yet, with stealth provisions, no agency
delegation exists; if Congress did not consider the terms of the stealth
provision itself, odds are neither did Congress decide the agency's role in
interpreting and/or implementing it. Lacking "clear legislative displace-
ment of judicial review, " "' stealth interpretive questions prudently fall
within the judicial realm. To defer to administrative agencies in such situ-
ations only exacerbates non-deliberation and non-delegation problems.252
Second, courts appear to be the least bad institution for interpret-
ing such stealth provisions. Although ideally unbiased objective experts,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries personnel
and Fish and Wildlife Service personnel are overseen by, and highly
sensitive to, the political agendas of the current executive and legislative
branches.253 An agency interpretation of a stealth provision resulting
from informal legislative and executive (and/or special interest lobbying)
pressures biases outcomes toward current rather than original legisla-
tive priorities while skirting constitutional safeguards.254
Third, democratic process values benefit.255 The stealth drafters'
strategy gets rebuffed because the interpretive approach offsets, or at
250 See A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note
248, at 56; Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 15, at 445, 476. In addition to
academic recognition, a number of courts have adopted this rationale as well. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
251 See Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 15, at 476.
252 Id. at 446.
253 Although theoretically buffered from politics, federal judges feel heat from the other
branches of government and public displeasure. However, even accounting for outside
pressures and personal ideology, on balance, it seems that individual judges will be less
influenced by and one step further removed from politics and special interest pressures
than administrative agencies.
254 Agencies must also be concerned that their implementation
strategies and interpretive choices do not irritate members of
Congress who control their budgets and can repeal or alter regulatory
statutes. Therefore, agencies necessarily consider legislative history
(although perhaps to discern the intent of the current Congress
rather than that of the enacting one).
A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 248, at
66. That said, another issue is whether greater distance is a good or a bad thing. Why
should the decision be left to the least democratically-accountable interpreter? One reason
is to retain and encourage acceptance of the "Administrative Agency as Expertise Model"
rather than the "Representational Model" even if it is somewhat flawed in practice.255 Id. at 72 (discussing democratic process values, statutory interpretation and interpre-
tative canons).
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least serves to dampen, language strategically inserted to weaken explic-
itly stated ESA priorities. Additionally, this approach may discourage
future stealth drafters.
3. Fuzzy Stealth Situations
A third least bad approach applies where a fuzzily worded stealth
provision yields various meanings, all or some of which comport with
ESA's expressed goals. When dealing with such ambiguities (which I will
refer to as Fuzzy Stealth Situations), the interpreting court would proceed
to Chevron Step Two and defer to any reasonable, non-arbitrary agency
interpretation to resolve the interpretive question.
The real craftiness of stealth provisions derives from their plain,
unequivocal-but-hidden meanings. To the extent the wording turns out
to be vague, uncertain, or wooly, it fails as a stealth provision and exists
merely as a poorly drafted proviso. In such cases the stealth interpretive
question closely resembles ordinary interpretive dilemmas and the
Chevron rationales for deference-agency expertise and regulatory
competence- operate as well as for flawed stealth provisions as for non-
stealth provisions.
Again, this is a less than perfect solution. It has the practical benefit
of consistency with the traditional and accepted interpretive approach.256
Yet there are shortcomings as well. It allows for agency interpretation
absent any clear legislative delegation of authority and replaces deliber-
ative congressional lawmaking with executive branch rulemaking simply
by virtue of congressional inattention to its constitutional duties. Here,
judicial rejection of arbitrary and capricious agency rules and congressional
amendment provide rather minimal constraints on agency lawmaking.
In sum, interpretation of true stealth provisions would likely end
with judicial interpretation under Chevron Step One. The least bad
approach would reinforce the intended objectives of the ESA and
simultaneously encourage legislative branch deliberation to improve
political accountability. On balance, while the approach does not entirely
2 6 Arguably, there is also an accountability benefit if one views agencies as more demo-
cratically accountable than courts by virtue of their institutional geography within the
executive branch. However, this approach contradicts and detracts from the notion of
agencies as collectives of objective professionals applying their scientific expertise in an
objective fashion. Agencies can not simultaneously behave as objective scientists and as
political representatives. As I prefer the agency expertise model, I argue that agencies
should not be expected to respond to elected officials.
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discourage stealth provision drafting, it does put stealth drafters, along
with Congress, on notice that congressional inattentiveness will not
automatically be resolved by agency bureaucrats, but by courts favoring
protective interpretations.
CONCLUSION
At a time when worldwide biodiversity losses appear to be rapidly
escalating at exponential rates,257 the federal ESA remains one of the
few laws with teeth for protecting biodiversity. In coming years, as
species continue to disappear, many will look to the ESA in hope of
stemming such losses. In particular, some may seek to invoke the
international provisions of section 8a to compel additional U.S. govern-
mental preservation efforts at home and abroad. In their efforts, these
advocates will no doubt seek to discover and to apply any hidden powers
within the ESA. As a result, the courts will again be forced to confront the
interpretive issue of ESA stealth provisions.
Moreover, the stealth provision interpretive dilemma exists beyond
the realm of environmental law. Participants in the legislative drafting
process slip both large and small stealth provisions past legislators in
budget bills and other major pieces of legislation as a matter of course.
Witness language included in wiretapping and energy legislation in 2007
and the cries of foul play thereafter. 258 Given historic and ongoing stealth
drafting efforts, the judicial branch will no doubt be called upon to inter-
pret stealth provisions in the future. Hopefully the courts will do so in
the least bad way.
257 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
211 See Edmond L. Andrews & Matthew L. Wald, Energy Bill Aids Expansion of Atomic
Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2007, at Al (noting that "[a] one-sentence provision buried
in the Senate's recently passed energy bill, inserted without debate at the urging of the
nuclear power industry, could make builders of new nuclear plants eligible for tens of
billions of dollars in government loan guarantees."); James Risen, Bush Signs Law to
Widen Reach for Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al (noting that "seemingly
subtle changes in legislative language [of wiretapping law] would sharply alter the legal
limits on the government's ability to monitor millions of phone calls and e-mail messages
going in and out of the United States.").
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